Republic of the Philippines
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRY BOARD

FINAL REPORT

RP-C5656
CESSNA 152

OPERATOR: FLITELINE AVIATION SCHOOL, INC.

TYPE OF OPERATION: FLIGHT TRAINING

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JULY 13, 2024

PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: RUNWAY 17, PLARIDEL COMMUNITY AIRPORT, LUMANG BAYAN, PLARIDEL, BULACAN, PHILIPPINES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Cessna 152, RP-C5656 Final Report)

Description			Page
Title Page		----------	
Table of Contents		----------	i
Foreword		----------	ii
Synopsis		----------	iii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviation		----------	iv
1	Factual Information	----------	1
1.1	History of Flight	----------	1
1.2	Injuries to Person	----------	2
1.3	Damage to Aircraft	----------	2
1.4	Other Damages	----------	2
1.5	Personnel Information	----------	3
	1.5.1 Flight Instructor (FI)	----------	3
	1.5.2 Student Pilot (SP)	----------	3
1.6	Aircraft Information	----------	3
	1.6.1 Aircraft Data	----------	3
	1.6.2 Engine Data	----------	4
	1.6.3 Propeller Data	----------	4
1.7	Meteorological Information	----------	4
1.8	Aids to Navigation	----------	4
1.9	Communications	----------	5
1.10	Aerodrome Information	----------	5
	1.10.1 General Information	----------	5
1.11	Flight Recorders	----------	6
1.12	Wreckage and Impact Information	----------	6
1.13	Medical & Pathological Information	----------	6
1.14	Fire	----------	7
1.15	Search and Survival Aspect	----------	7
1.16	Test and Research	----------	7
1.17	Organization and Management Information	----------	8
	1.17.1 Operator	----------	8
	1.17.2 Maintenance	----------	8
2	Analysis	----------	8
2.1	General	----------	8
2.2	Runway Condition	----------	9
2.3	Flight Handling and Actions	----------	9
2.4	Recovery from Bounced Landing	----------	10
3	Conclusions	----------	11
3.1	Findings	----------	11
3.2	Probable Cause	----------	11
	3.2.1 Primary Cause Factor	----------	11
	3.2.2 Contributory Cause Factor	----------	11
4	Safety Recommendation	----------	12
4.1	The Safety Deficiencies	----------	12
5	Safety Actions	----------	12
5.1	Following the occurrence	----------	12
	Signatories	----------	12
	Appendices	----------	App A

FOREWORD

This report was produced by the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB), Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, MIA Road, Pasay City, Philippines.

The report is based upon the investigation carried out by the AAIIB in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Republic Act 9497 Section 42, and Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation Part 13.

Readers are advised that the AAIIB investigates for the sole purpose of enhancing aviation safety. Consequently, AAIIB reports are confined to matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other purpose. It should be noted that the information in AAIIB reports and recommendations is provided to promote aviation safety, and in no case is it intended to imply blame or liability.

Furthermore, no part of the AAIIB report or reports relating to any accident or investigation shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.

FINAL REPORT

TITLE: A serious incident involving a Textron Aviation Inc., Cessna 152 type of aircraft with Registry Number RP-C5656 operated by Fliteline Aviation School, Inc., had an aircraft overrun at Runway 17, Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan, Philippines on July 13, 2024 at about 1345H (Local).

Notification of Occurrence to National Authority

The notification of serious incident to AAIIB CAAP was relayed by the Operator of the aircraft at 1700H (LOCAL) on July 13, 2024.

Identification of the Investigation Authority

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB), the mandated accident investigation organization within the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as the state of Occurrence/Registry/Operator conducted the investigation.

Organization of the Investigation

In accordance with provisions of Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation (PCAR) Part 13, an Investigator-In-Charge was appointed.

Authority Releasing the Report

The Final investigation report was released by Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB) and published on the CAAP website on **02 June 2025.**

Synopsis:

On July 13, 2024 at about 1345H (Local), a Textron Aviation Inc., Cessna 152 type of aircraft with Registry Number RP-C5656 operated by Fliteline Aviation School, Inc., had an aircraft overrun at Runway 17, Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan, Philippines. The Two (2) occupants sustained minor injuries, however the aircraft received damage as a result of the serious incident. Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC) prevailed at the time of the serious incident. The cause of the occurrence was attributed to the improper recovery techniques of the SP from a bounced landing and the FI's delayed remedial action during the attempted go-around resulted in a runway excursion.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAIIB	:	Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board
AMO	:	Approved Maintenance Organization
ASPH	:	Asphalt
ATOC	:	Aircraft Training Organization Certificate
ARFFS	:	Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Services
CAAP	:	Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
COA	:	Certificate of Airworthiness
COR	:	Certificate of Registration
CPL	:	Commercial Pilot License
FI	:	Flight Instructor
MHZ	:	Megahertz
OFSAM	:	Office of Flight Surgeon and Aviation
PCAR	:	Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation
PCN	:	Pavement Classification Number
RPUX	:	ICAO designation for Plaridel Community Airport
RWY	:	Runway
SP	:	Student Pilot
SPL	:	Student Pilot License
UTC	:	Universal Time Coordinated
VFR	:	Visual Flight Rules
VHF	:	Very High Frequency
VMC	:	Visual Meteorological Condition

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

Aircraft Registration No.	:	RP-C5656
Aircraft Type/Model	:	Textron Aviation Inc./Cessna 152
Operator	:	Fliteline Aviation School, Inc.
Address of Operator	:	Runway 17, Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan, Philippines
Place of Occurrence	:	Runway 17, Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan, Philippines
Date/Time of Occurrence	:	July 13, 2024/ 1345H(Local)/0545UTC
Type of Operation	:	Flight Training
Phase of Flight	:	Landing
Type of Occurrence	:	Aircraft overrun

1.1 History of Flight

On or about 1345H of July 13, 2024, a Textron Aviation Inc. Cessna 152 type of aircraft with registration number RP-C5656 sustained damage upon bounced landing followed by an excursion at Runway 17, Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan, Philippines. The aircraft is being operated by Fliteline Aviation School, Inc., based at Plaridel Airport. The aircraft departed at around 1330H from the same airport for scheduled flight training. Onboard the aircraft were the Flight Instructor (FI) seated on the right side and a Student Pilot (SP) on the left side. The aircraft's final position was at coordinates 14° 53’ 12.76” N, 120° 5111.44” E, and a final heading of 168°.

The aircraft sustained damage to its wings, left landing gear, fuselage, upper and lower engine cowlings, and propeller. In addition, the two (2) occupants sustained minor injuries. The FI and SP were able to exit from the aircraft on their own and were transported to a hospital for medical assistance. Visual metrological condition prevailed at the time of occurrence, and a training flight plan was filed by the operator. The

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

responding Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS) personnel assisted in securing the aircraft.

Figure 1 - The aircrafts final resting point.

1.2 Injuries to Person (s)

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others	TOTAL
Fatal	0	0	0	**0**
Serious	0	0	0	**0**
Minor	2	0	0	**2**
None	0	0	0	**0**

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

The aircraft sustained substantial damage.

1.4 Other Damages

The aircraft impact caused damage to both the airport perimeter fence and a residential structure.

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Flight Instructor (FI)

Gender	:	Male
Date of Birth	:	June 27, 1998
Nationality	:	Filipino
License	:	148645-FI valid until April 24, 2025 148645-CPL valid until December 31, 2026
Type rating	:	FI- Single Engine Land-C152 Airplane: Single Engine Land-C152, C172, Instrument
Medical Certificate Valid up to	:	Class I, August 26, 2024
Time on Aircraft	:	285 + 18 Hours
Grand Total time	:	200 + 18 Hours

1.5.2 Student Pilot (SP)

Gender	:	Female
Date of Birth	:	August 123, 2004
Nationality	:	Filipino
License	:	155332 - Student Pilot License (SPL)
Valid up to	:	June 29, 2026
Type rating	:	Single Engine Land- C152
Medical Certificate Valid up to	:	Class 2, June 29, 2026
Time on Aircraft	:	61+30 Hours
Grand Total time	:	61+30 Hours

1.6 Aircraft Information

The Cessna 152 is an American two-seat, fixed-tricycle-gear, general aviation airplane, used primarily for flight training and personal use. It was based on the earlier Cessna 150 incorporating a number of minor design changes and a slightly more powerful engine with a longer time between overhaul.

1.6.1 Aircraft Data

Registration Mark	:	RP-C5656
Manufacturer	:	Textron Aviation Inc. Cessna
Country of Manufacturer	:	USA
Type/Model	:	Cessna C152
Operator	:	Fliteline Aviation School, Inc.
Serial No.	:	15280697

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

Date of Manufacture	:	1978
Certificate of Airworthiness valid up to	:	May 20, 2025
Certificate of Registration valid up to	:	September 27, 2024
Category	:	Normal
Number of Aircrew	:	2
Max Take-off Weight	:	757.5 Kilos
Airframe total time	:	20,974+48 Hours

1.6.2 Engine Data

The Lycoming O-235 is a family of four-cylinder, air-cooled, horizontally opposed piston aircraft engines that produce 100 to 135 hp (75 to 101 kW), derived from the earlier O-233 engine. The engine has variants of C1, C1A, C1B, C1C, C2A, C2B, C2C, E1, E2A, E2B, F1, F1B, F2A, F2B, G1, G1B, G2A, H2C, J2A, J2B, K2A, K2B, K2C, L2A, L2C, M1, M2C, M3C, N2A, N2C, P1, P2A, P2C and P3C.

Manufacturer	:	Lycoming
Type/Model	:	Piston/O-235-L2C
Engine SN#	:	L-25883-15
Time Between Overhaul	:	2,400 Hours
Engine total time	:	13,966+10 Hours as of last C of A

1.6.3 Propeller Data

Sensenich Fixed Pitch/ 72CKS6-0-54 is an Aluminum Propeller was designed for use on the Lycoming O-235 engine. This propeller has become a favorite of Cessna 152 owners. This blade was designed for in aircraft with a speed range of 80 – 130 MPH.

Manufacturer	:	Sensenich
Type	:	Fixed Pitch
Type/Model	:	Aluminum/72CKS6-0-54
Propeller SN#	:	11266
Date last Installed	:	July 12, 2024
Propeller total time	:	2+48 Hours

1.7 Meteorological Information

Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the occurrence.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

The flight was carried out under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). The pilot must be able to operate the aircraft with visual references to the ground and visually avoiding obstructions and

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

other aircraft.

1.9 Communications

The aircraft is equipped with operational Very High Frequency (VHF) transceiver used for communicating with aerodrome personnel and other aircrafts in the area. Air traffic over the aerodrome is directly controlled by Plaridel Tower at 122.4MHz.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

Plaridel Community Airport (RPUX) is being operated by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines and is listed in the CAAP-approved aerodrome facility data as well as the Philippine Aeronautical Information Publication.

1.10.1 General Information

Aerodrome Name	:	Plaridel Community Airport – RPUX
ARP coordinates and site at AD	:	145329.5445N 1205111.1410E.
Aerodrome Operator address, telephone, telefax, telex, AFS	:	Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines Plaridel Airport, Plaridel 3004 Bulacan Province PHONE: (044) 795-0637 / (02) 879-9122 to 9125.
Types of traffic permitted (IFR/VFR)	:	VFR
AD category for fire fighting	:	CAT IV. One (1) fire truck - Sides VMA28 and land rover.
Apron surface and strength		Surface: PCCP. Strength: Nil.
Taxiway width, surface and strength	:	Width: 9M. Surface: ASPH. Strength: Nil.
Aerodrome Obstacles		17/35 Trees and houses. Water tank, Meralco post Batching plant. Exercise caution during landing and take-off.
ATS Communication Facilities	:	Plaridel Control Tower
Frequency/Operation	:	122.4MHZ, 5447.5KHZ, 3834KHZ / 2300 – 0900
Airspace classification	:	Class B
Runway Direction	:	17/35
Runway Length	:	900 Meters
Runway Width	:	30 Meters
Surface	:	PCN 8 F/C/Y/U/ASPH

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

1.11 Flight Recorders

The aircraft is not equipped with any flight recorders and existing Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation does not require it.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The flight instructor took control of the aircraft upon encountering a bounced landing from the SP and executed a go-around. The FI observed that the aircraft was not climbing normally, so he elected to make a forced landing on the remaining runway. The FI applied the full brakes to bring the aircraft to a stop. However, they had already overshot the runway and collided with the airport perimeter fence, near a house. The aircraft's final position was at coordinates 14° 53' 12.76" N, 120° 5111.44" E, and a final heading of 168°. The aircraft sustained significant damage to its wings, left landing gear, fuselage, upper and lower engine cowlings, and propeller. In addition, the aircraft's two (2) occupants sustained minor injuries. The FI and SP were able to exit from the aircraft on their own. The responding Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS) personnel assisted in securing the aircraft.

Figure 2 - The damages incurred by RP-C5656.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

Both pilots have undergone the post-accident medical examination at CAAP-OFSAM on July 15, 2024. There were no medical impediment or remarks noted after that hindered

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

their fitness to fly. The two (2) pilots were able to egress from the aircraft with minor injuries and were brought to Marcelo-Padilla Medical Hospital Corp. for assessment. The FI suffered a slight physical injury abrasion on his left thumb, while the SP suffered a slight physical injury contusion hematoma on her forehead. After treatment, both pilots were released from the hospital.

1.14 Fire

No evidence of post impact fire was noted during on-site investigation as a result of the occurrence.

1.15 Search and Survival Aspects

The occurrence was survivable since it happened at a controlled aerodrome facility. Aerodrome emergency responders and the operator support group were able to reach the site immediately. As for the aircraft ELT, it was found operational and functioning according to its design standards. It was transmitting the distress signal at the time of the event and was monitored by receiving stations nationwide.

1.16 Test and Research

An inspection of the aircraft structures for damage assessment was conducted by the operator together with their mechanics and was witnessed by an AAIIB investigator on July 14, 2024. The aircraft engine was also inspected on the same day. A flaps retraction/extension activity was performed by the operator and witnessed by the AAIIB investigator. The flaps are operated by a flap switch, which is a "step type." It can be set by one (1) step increment or decline. It was found that the flaps were operational at the time of occurrence.



Figure 3 - The "Step-type" Flap switch.

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

1.17 Organizational and Management Information

1.17.1 Operator

Fliteline Aviation School, Inc. has an Aircraft Training Organization Certificate (ATOC) #2006-99 valid until October 21, 2024 authorized to perform Flight ang Ground training operations that provides private pilot course, commercial pilot course, instrument rating course, flight instructor course and refresher for single/multi engine land services. Fliteline Aviation School, Inc. flight operation is located at Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan, Philippines. The aircraft RP-C5656, is listed on their ATOC Operations specification.

1.17.2 Maintenance

Fliteline Aviation Services, Inc. is a holder of an Approved Maintenance Organization Certificate (AMOC) # AMO-66-07 empowered to operate as an Approved Maintenance Organization in compliance with the requirements of the Civil Aviation Regulation (PCAR) Part 6 with official address at Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Plaridel, Bulacan, Philippines. The maintenance function of RP-C5656 is being undertaken by Fliteline Aviation Services, Inc. Repair Station.

2. ANALYSIS

2.1 General

The investigation determined that the aircraft was engaged in routine flight training operations in the vicinity of Plaridel Airport. The flight activity included two (2) full-stop landings, followed by airwork exercises conducted outside the airport's traffic pattern. This sortie was the first flight of the day for the student pilot (SP).

During an attempted full-stop landing, the SP touched down approximately three hundred fifty (350) meters beyond the threshold of Runway 17. The aircraft bounced three (3) times along the runway, prompting the flight instructor (FI) to assume control. As the aircraft became airborne again, the FI immediately retracted the flaps by one setting. Upon doing so, he observed an abnormal climb performance.

Recognizing that the aircraft would be unable to clear an upcoming obstacle, the FI elected to abort the climb and attempt a landing on the remaining runway. Upon touchdown, the aircraft bounced again, experienced a hard landing, and was unable to achieve sufficient deceleration to stop within the available runway length. The aircraft subsequently overran the runway and collided with the aerodrome perimeter fence. It came to rest upright after striking a vertical structure located approximately two hundred (200) meters beyond the threshold of Runway 17.

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

No post-accident fire occurred. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the event, and a training flight plan had been duly filed.

2.2 Runway Condition Assessment

An ocular inspection of the runway was conducted on 14 July 2024 by representatives from the operator, airport duty personnel, and a Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines – Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (CAAP-AAIIB) investigator.

During the inspection, it was observed that the runway surface exhibited no physical deficiencies that could pose a hazard to aircraft operations. Specifically, there were no indications of potholes, uneven pavement, foreign object debris (FOD), or surface contamination that could compromise the safety of takeoff or landing maneuvers.

Runway markings and markers were found to be present and adequately maintained within the aircraft movement area, providing necessary visual cues and reference guides for pilot operations.

However, the inspection also identified the presence of several vertical structures located within the perimeter fence near both thresholds of Runway 17 and Runway 35. These structures were assessed to constitute potential hazards to aerodrome traffic, particularly during takeoff, landing, and aborted approach phases.

2.3 Flight Handling and Actions

Witnesses reported that during the student pilot's (SP) initial approach on her first flight of the day, the aircraft was observed to be slightly high relative to the normal glide path. The SP later stated that she attempted corrective actions; however, due to incorrect flight control inputs, the aircraft passed beyond the designated runway landing zone. The aircraft subsequently touched down approximately three hundred fifty (350) meters beyond the threshold of Runway 17, maintaining alignment with the runway centerline. Upon touchdown, the aircraft bounced three (3) times, consuming an additional eighty (80) meters of runway distance. At this point, the flight instructor (FI) assumed control of the aircraft.

The FI initiated a go-around; however, the aircraft failed to achieve the desired climb performance. This was attributed to the flap system being in a transitional state, having been retracted by one setting, adversely affecting the aircraft's lift capability. Faced with a deteriorating climb performance and imminent obstacle clearance concerns, the FI elected to execute a forced landing on the remaining runway. Due to the delayed remedial action during the go-around attempt, the aircraft bounced again upon landing, was unable to decelerate adequately, and subsequently collided with the aerodrome perimeter fence, resulting in substantial damage to the aircraft.

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

The sequence of events leading to the occurrence was initiated during the approach and landing phases. Based on witness interviews and flight path reconstruction, it was determined that the aircraft was high and fast on final approach. The approach was not stabilized within recommended safety margins. Standard operating procedures require instructors to recognize and intervene during unstable approaches. In this case, the FI did not intervene promptly to prevent the continuation of a destabilized approach, allowing the SP to continue the approach into a degraded energy state and ultimately land outside the intended touchdown zone.

Although the SP managed to achieve a touchdown, the landing was not properly executed, resulting in successive bounces. These bounces increased the risk exposure significantly, as aircraft control became progressively compromised.

The regulatory authority has established several interventions aimed at mitigating risks during the approach and landing phases, including the implementation of stabilized approach criteria. These criteria are intended to ensure that the aircraft is on a proper glide path, at an appropriate speed, configuration, and descent rate. The SP did not meet the stabilized approach criteria during this approach. Despite the apparent risks, the FI allowed the SP to maintain control beyond the point at which positive instructor intervention would have been critical.

The SP's inappropriate actions and inactions appear to have been a result of being overwhelmed by a series of compounding flight deviations, exacerbated by poor aircraft energy management and failure to execute an appropriate landing decision. The investigation further revealed that the SP had not conducted a landing briefing and failed to adequately monitor her descent path against the required vertical profile. Consequently, the aircraft's touchdown point was significantly displaced from the intended aim point, indicating that a go-around should have been initiated prior to touchdown.

2.4 Bounced Landing Recovery

Bounced landings are relatively common occurrences during flight training and, when properly managed, can still result in a safe and smooth touchdown. In accordance with procedures outlined in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), pilots should immediately configure the aircraft appropriately for landing following a bounce.

Upon experiencing a bounce, the pilot should maintain steady back pressure on the control yoke or stick to preserve a nose-high landing attitude. If the aircraft's nose attitude becomes excessively high, a slight relaxation of back pressure may be necessary; however, pilots must avoid pushing the nose downward aggressively. Forcing the nose down can result in a harder secondary touchdown or, more critically, a nose gear-first landing, leading to potential structural damage.

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

As the aircraft descends toward the runway following a bounce, it may be necessary to apply a small amount of power to decrease the descent rate and facilitate a soft touchdown. Care must be taken to avoid overcorrection; minimal and precise power adjustments are typically sufficient to stabilize the aircraft and achieve a safe landing.

In situations where a stable landing cannot be assured, executing a go-around remains a prudent and recommended course of action. A go-around maneuver provides the opportunity to reestablish control and conduct a subsequent approach under stabilized conditions.

In this particular occurrence, while multiple factors contributed to the accident sequence, the most plausible explanation for the continuation of the descent and subsequent runway excursion appears to be the student pilot's fixation on completing the landing. The failure to adequately recover from the bounced landing, combined with a loss of situational awareness during critical phases of flight control transfer, ultimately led to the loss of runway containment.

3. CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings

a. Both pilots are qualified for the Textron Aviation Inc. Cessna C152 type of aircraft and familiar with Fliteline Aviation School, Inc.
b. Both pilots have valid pilot licenses and medical certificates issued by the CAAP.
c. The aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with CAAP-PCARs and approved procedures.
d. The aircraft has current Certificates of Airworthiness and Registration.
e. The aircraft was properly released for flight without any discrepancies noted on its logbook.
f. A visual meteorological condition prevailed at the time of the incident.

3.2 Probable Cause

3.2.1 Primary Cause Factor

a. Improper recovery techniques of the SP from a bounced landing.
b. The FI's delayed intervention during the attempted go-around.

3.2.2 Contributory Factors

a. High approach during landing.
b. Lack of situational awareness.
c. Unable to identify and manage threat during landing.

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

4.1 The safety deficiencies detailed in this report have been fully addressed as a result of the safety measures implemented by the Operator. Consequently, no further safety recommendations are being proposed.

5. SAFETY ACTIONS

5.1 Following the occurrence, Fliteline Aviation School, Inc. initiated the following safety corrective actions (Appendix-A):

a. On July 16 2024 – The Operator Conducted Safety Seminar in relation to the occurrence (RP-C5656 Incident).
b. On August 05, 09, & 16 2024 - The Operator Conducted Simulator Checks on Flight Instructors below 500hrs.
c. On August 10,12,16,21,22 & 24 2024 - The Operator Conducted Actual Flight Checks on the affected FI's.

-----END-----

MIA Road, Corner Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Pasay City, Philippines, 1300
+632 8246 4988 | opcen@caap.gov.ph | https://caap.gov.ph