

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRY BOARD

FINAL REPORT

<u>RP-C5801</u> TEXTRON AVIATION INC., BARON BE-58

OPERATOR: FLITELINE AIRWAYS PHILS., INC.

TYPE OF OPERATION: GENERAL AVIATION

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: SEPTEMBER 24, 2022

PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: DUMAGUETE PRINCIPAL AIRPORT, AGAN-AN, SIBULAN, DUMAGUETE CITY, NEGROS ORIENTAL, PHILIPPINES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Textron Aviation Inc., Baron BE-58, RP-C5801 Final Report)

Descrip	tion	Page
Title Pag	ge	
Table of	Contents	 i
Forewor	-d	 ii
Synopsis	5	 iii
List of A	cronyms and Abbreviation	 iv
1	Factual Information	 1
1.1	History of Flight	 1
1.2	Injuries to Person	 2
1.3	Damage to Aircraft	 2
1.4	Other Damages	 3
1.5	Personnel Information	 3
	1.5.1 Pilot-In-Command (PIC)	 3
1.6	Aircraft Information	 3
	1.6.1Aircraft Data	 3
	1.6.2 Engine Data	 4
	1.6.3 Propeller Data	 4
1.7	Meteorological Information	 4
1.8	Aids to Navigation	 4
1.9	Communications	 5
1.10	Aerodrome Information (AIP)	 5
	1.10.1 General Information	 5
1.11	Flight Recorders	 6
1.12	Wreckage and Impact Information	 6
1.13	Medical & Pathological Information	 6
1.14	Fire	 7
1.15	Search and Survival Aspect	 7
1.16	Organization and Management Information	 7
	1.16.1 Operator	 7
	1.16.2 Maintenance	 7
2.0	Analysis	 7
2.1	General	 7
2.2	Windshear From Thunderstorms	 8
2.3	Continuation Bias and Its Impact on Flight Safety	 9
2.4	Situational Awareness (SA) and Decision-Making Breakdown	 9
2.5	Threat and Error Management (TEM) Considerations	 9
2.6	Loss of Control and Recovery	 10
2.7	Safety Lessons	 10
2.8	Aircraft Inspection	 11
3.0	Conclusion	 12
3.1	Findings	 12
3.2	Probable Cause	 12
	3.2.1 Primary Cause Factor	 12
	3.2.2 Contributory Cause Factor	 13
4.0	Safety Recommendation	 13
4.1	The safety deficiencies detailed	 13
5.0	Safety Actions	 13
5.1	Following the occurrence	 13
	Signatories	 14
	Appendix	 App-A

FOREWORD

This report was produced by the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB), Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, MIA Road, Pasay City, Philippines.

The report is based upon the investigation carried out by the AAIIB in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Republic Act 9497 Section 42, and Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation Part 13.

Readers are advised that the AAIIB investigates for the sole purpose of enhancing aviation safety. Consequently, AAIIB reports are confined to matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other purpose. It should be noted that the information in AAIIB reports and recommendations is provided to promote aviation safety, and in no case is it intended to imply blame or liability.

Furthermore, no part of the AAIIB report or reports relating to any accident or investigation shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.



FINAL REPORT

TITLE: Incident involving a Textron Aviation Inc., Baron BE-58 type of aircraft with Registry Number RP-C5801 operated by Fliteline Airways Phils., Inc., had encountered partial detached left elevator at Dumaguete Principal Airport, Agan-an, Sibulan, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Philippines, on September 24, 2022 at about 1100H/03:00UTC.

Notification of Occurrence to National Authority

The Notification of incident to AAIIB CAAP was relayed by the Operator of the aircraft at 1530H (LOCAL) on September 24, 2022.

Identification of the Investigation Authority

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB), the mandated accident investigation organization within the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as the state of Occurrence/Registry/ Operator conducted the investigation.

Organization of the Investigation

In accordance with provisions of Philippine Civil Aviation Regulation (PCAR) Part 13, an Investigator-In-Charge was appointed.

Authority Releasing the Report

The Final investigation report was released by Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board (AAIIB) and published on the CAAP website on <u>**31 March 2025.**</u>

Synopsis:

On September 24, 2022, at about 1100H, a Textron Aviation Inc., Baron BE-58 type of aircraft with registry number RP-C5801 operated by Fliteline Airways Phils., Inc., had partial detached left elevator at Dumaguete Principal Airport, Agan-an, Sibulan, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Philippines. The Pilot with five (5) occupants did not sustain any injuries; however, the aircraft sustained minor damage as a result of the incident. An Instrument Meteorological Condition (IMC) prevailed at the time of the incident. The cause of the occurrence was attributed to the structural failure of the left elevator due to the aircraft entering a severe weather system during descent.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAIIB	:	Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board
AIP	:	Aerodrome Information
AOC	:	Air Operator Certificate
AMO	:	Approved Maintenance Organization
ATC	:	Air Traffic Control
ATZ	:	Air Traffic Zone
CAAP	:	Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
CB	:	Cumulonimbus
COA	:	Certificate of Airworthiness
Conc	:	Concrete
CPL	:	Commercial Pilot License
IFR	:	Instrument Flight Rules
IMC	:	Instrument Meteorological Conditions
Μ	:	Meter(s)
NIL	:	Not In List
OFSAM	:	Office of the Flight Surgeon and Aviation Medicine
PIC	:	Pilot-In-Command
RWY	:	Runway
SA	:	Situational Awareness
TEM	:	Threat and Error Management
UTC	:	Universal Time Coordinated
VFR	:	Visual Flight Rules
VMC	:	Visual Meteorological Condition
WS	:	Windshear



1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

Aircraft Registration No.	:	RP-C5801
Aircraft Type/Model	:	Textron Aviation Inc., Baron BE-58
Operator	:	Fliteline Airways Phils., Inc.
Address of Operator	:	Plaridel Airport, Lumang Bayan Plaridel, Bulacan, Philippines
Place of Occurrence	:	Dumaguete Principal Airport, Agan-an, Sibulan, Dumaguete City Negros Oriental Philippines
Date/Time of Occurrence	:	September 24, 2022 at about 1100H/0300 UTC.
Type of Operation	:	General Aviation
Phase of Flight	:	Descent
Type of Occurrence	:	Aircraft elevator

1.1 History of Flight

On or about 0800H, September 24, 2022, a Textron Aviation Inc., Baron B58 type of aircraft with Registry Number RP-C5801 departed Clark International Airport. The flight was uneventful until the aircraft entered into a cloud buildup, resulting in the separation of the left elevator. The event happened during descent for approach to Dumaguete Principal Airport, after passing over reporting point Nanas. The aircraft was being operated by Fliteline Airways Philippines Inc. under a general aviation flight.

There were no injuries to the pilot (P) or the five other occupants on board. The flight originated from Clark International Airport and was to be terminated at Dumaguete Principal Airport in an IFR flight plan. During the enroute, while cruising at about ten thousand feet (10,000 ft), the pilot noticed a weather build-up. The Mactan approach controller advised the flight to descend to eight thousand feet (8,000 ft), pass the reporting point Nanas, and contact Dumaguete Tower. As the flight was at coordinates N 9.563873, E 123.238487, about sixteen (16) nautical miles north of Dumaguete

airport, the aircraft started to bank to the right, and the aircraft's altitude dropped. The pilot managed to recover from the sudden altitude change and leveled off at two thousand feet (2,000 ft). The pilot did not declare priority nor emergency. The flight landed normally and was directed by ATC to park at the general aviation ramp. The occupants and the pilot safely disembarked from the aircraft. The pilot inspected the aircraft and discovered the missing left elevator.



Figure 1 - RP-C8612 at the ramp after the incident.

1.2 Injuries to Person (s)

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others	TOTAL
Fatal	0	0	0	0
Serious	0	0	0	0
Minor	0	0	0	0
Missing	0	0	0	0

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

The rudder and tail cone of the aircraft sustained damage, and the left elevator was missing.

1.4 Other Damages

There were no reported other damages during the site investigation.

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Pilot-In-Command (PIC)

Gender	:	Male
Date of Birth	:	December 18, 1989
Nationality	:	Filipino
Civil Status	:	Single
License Type	:	101511-CPL
License Validity	:	September 30, 2024
Type Rating	:	Airplane: Single &Multi-Engine Land-
		Instrument-C152, C172, BN2A-21,
		PA23-250, BE-58
Medical Certificate Validity	:	November 5, 2022
Total Flying Time on type	:	70+42 Hour
Total Flying Time	:	4,225+42 Hours

1.6 Aircraft Information

The Beechcraft Baron is a light, twin-engine piston aircraft developed by Beechcraft now Textron Aviation Inc. The Baron is a low-wing monoplane developed from the Travel Air and was introduced in 1961. Production of the aircraft is still ongoing. Barons come in three basic types: the Baron 55 (short body), Baron 56 (BE-56), and Baron 58 (BE-58) (long body) configuration.

1.6.1 Aircraft Data

Registration Mark	: RP-C5801
Manufacturer	: Textron Aviation Inc.
Type/Model	: Textron Aviation Inc./ Baron BE-58
Operator	: Fliteline Airways Phils. Inc.
Serial No./Type Certificate	: TH-738 / 3A16
Number of Crew	: 1
Passenger Seats	: 5
Certificate of Airworthiness Valid up to	: November 09, 2022
Certificate of Registration Date of Issue	: December 28, 2022
Time Since New	: 9,790 + 31 Hours as of last COA



1.6.2 Engine Data

The Continental O-520 is a six-cylinder, horizontally opposed aircraft engine produced by Teledyne Continental Motors. Its first run was in 1963 as a development of the IO-346, it has been produced in versions incorporating fuel injection (IO-520), turbo-charging (TSIO-520), and gearing (GTSIO-520). The aircraft is fitted with the IO-520 variant type of engine.

Manufacturer	:	Continental Motors
Type/Model	:	Horizontally Opposed Piston, fuel injected/IO-520-C1B
Engine Serial Number (1)	:	287253-R
Engine Serial Number (2)	:	810810-R
Time Between Overhaul (1)	:	Newly Overhauled
Time Between Overhaul (2)	:	Newly Overhauled
Time Since Overhaul (1)	:	1,700 Hours
Time Since Overhaul (2)	:	1,700 Hours
Time Since New (1)	:	75 + 00 Hours
Time Since New (2)	:	75 + 00 Hours

1.6.3 Propeller Data

The aircraft was equipped with is an all-aluminum propeller built Hartzell Propeller, Inc. The Baron BE-58 Propeller is designated as the PHC-J3YF-2UF propeller for long body Baron aircraft. The Hartzell PHC-J3YF-2UF Propeller has three (3) blades with full feathering, constant speed design.

: Hartzell Propeller, Inc.
: Aluminum/PHC-J3YF-2UF
: ED779E
: ED2552E
: 5 May 2021
: 5 May 2021
: 1,267+60 Hours
: 1,267+60 Hours

1.7 Meteorological Information

Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the occurrence.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

The flight is being conducted through Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) allows aircraft to be flown under Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)



by reference to aircraft flight instruments and advanced navigation systems.

1.9 Communications

The aircraft was equipped with a standard radio transceiver. Communications were carried out between the pilot and air traffic controller within the area.

1.10 Aerodrome Information (AIP)

Dumaguete Principal Airport (RPVD) is operated by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines. The airport is classified as a Class 1 principal (Minor Domestic) and is listed in the CAAP approved aerodrome facility data as well the Philippine Aeronautical Information Publication. Dumaguete Airport is located approximately 1.3 nautical miles from Dumaguete town center. It takes approximately 10 minutes from town center to get to this airport with light traffic.

1.10.1 General Information

Aerodrome Name ARP coordinates and site at AD	 Dumaguete Principal Airp RPVD/DGT 092003N 1231807E 	oort (Class 1)–
Aerodrome Operator address, telephone, telefax, telex	Civil Aviation Authority of Dumaguete Airport Agan Dumaguete City 6201 Ne Philippines	the Philippines -an Sibulan, gros Oriental,
AFS Types of traffic permitted (IFR/V Runway Lights Elevation	 Email: dumaguete_aport(IFR-VFR Edge: All Twy, Center line 13 M (43 FT) 	@caap.gov.ph : Nil
AD category for fire fighting	: CAT VI. Two (2) Fire trucks (6000 liters each)	s [Two (2) Oshkosh
Apron surface and strength	Strength: Nil.	
Taxiway width, surface and strength	: Width: 45M. Surface: Concrete. Strength: Nil. : Rwy 09 Terrain at 604FT a	at 092808.9N
Aerodrome Obstacles	1232128.0E Rwy 27 Terrain at 3114FT 1225949.2E	at 094920.5N
ATS Communication Facilities	: 129.70Mhz Primary 123.50Mhz Secondary	



VOR Frequency Airspace classification Runway Direction Runway Length Runway Width Surface Windcone

- : 114.10Mhz
- : Class ATZ-B; CTR-D
- : 09/27
- : 1,936 Meters
- : 45 Meters
- : PCN 33 F/B/X/U/CONC+Asphalt overlay Lighted windcone location: 300 M from THR
- : of RWY 09/27

1.11 Flight Recorders

The aircraft was not equipped with any flight recorders and existing CAAP regulation does not require it.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

At approximately 8,000 feet, the aircraft encountered cloud turbulence, causing it to bank right. It then experienced a sudden altitude drop, but the pilot regained control and leveled off at 2,000 feet. After ensuring the occupants were unharmed and informed of the incident, the flight landed safely at Dumaguete Principal Airport. A post-flight inspection by the pilot and company mechanic revealed damage to the rudder and tail cone, with the left elevator missing (Figure 2).



Figure 2 - The damaged emphanage section of the aircraft.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

The pilot has undergone the post-accident medical examination at CAAP-OFSAM and there was no medical impediment that hindered his fitness to fly. The pilot medical



result confirmed that he met the CAAP Medical Standards for exercising the privileges of the license he held.

1.14 Fire

There was no reported post-crash fire during on-site investigation.

1.15 Search and Survival Aspect

The incident was survivable, there was no other vital damage on the aircraft. No search operation was deployed since the flight landed safely at RPVD.

1.16 Organizational and Management Information

1.16.1 Operator

Fliteline Airways Phils. Inc. is located at 1513 Metrica St. Sampaloc, Manila, Philippines as its primary place of business. The company has principal operations base at Plaridel Community Airport, Plaridel Airport. The company is working to get and approved Airline Operation Certificate (AOC) licensed by the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP). Currently it is operating four (1) Britten-Norman BN-2 Islander and one (1) Beech Baron BE58.

1.16.2 Maintenance

The maintenance function of RP-C5801 is being undertaken by Fliteline Airways Phils. Inc. Repair Station with a current Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO) Certificate number 66-07 located at Plaridel Community Airport, Lumang Bayan, Bulacan, Philippines. The aircraft has undergone its annual inspection for the renewal of its airworthiness certification prior to the incident.

2.0 ANALYSIS

2.1 General

At approximately 0800H on September 24, 2022, a Textron Aviation Inc. Baron B58 aircraft, registered as RP-C5801, departed Clark International Airport on an IFR flight plan operated by Fliteline Airways Phils. Inc. under general aviation. The flight proceeded uneventfully until the aircraft encountered a cloud buildup during descent for approach to Dumaguete Principal Airport, resulting in the separation of the left elevator. The event occurred after passing the reporting point Nanas.

The aircraft was cruising at approximately 10,000 feet when the pilot observed a developing weather system. Mactan Approach instructed the flight to descend to 8,000 feet, pass reporting point Nanas, and establish contact with Dumaguete Tower. At coordinates N 9.563873, E 123.238487, approximately 16 nautical miles north of Dumaguete Airport, the aircraft experienced an un-commanded right bank followed by a sudden altitude loss. The pilot successfully regained control and stabilized the aircraft at 2,000 feet without declaring an emergency or priority status.

The flight proceeded to Dumaguete Principal Airport, where it landed without further incident. Air Traffic Control (ATC) directed the aircraft to the general aviation ramp, where the pilot and five occupants disembarked safely. A post-flight inspection by the pilot revealed the complete loss of the left elevator.

2.2 Windshear from Thunderstorms

A Windshear (WS) is a rapid change in wind velocity and direction. This change can be horizontal and/or vertical depending on the location of the WS relative to a moving aircraft. The vertical movement of an air mass is called downdraft or updraft. A downdraft is a vertical air mass movement that pushes you down and the updraft is an air mass that pulls you up. These drafts are present inside the Cumulonimbus (CB) clouds, the stronger the drafts the more powerful will be the CB (Figure 3). If a pilot flies an aircraft inside a Windshear, he will experience an airspeed increment or decrement depending on which stage of this weather phenomenon a pilot is in. Thunderstorms produce the most severe weather you can find in aviation. And aircrafts do not need to be inside a thunderstorm to find serious wind shear.

When the updrafts are stronger than the downdrafts the CB will grow and become bigger, however, there is a point in which the downdrafts are stronger than the updrafts, causing the air, the rain, and other weather phenomena that are present inside the CB, to go downward.



Figure 3 - Cumulonimbus type of cloud contains turbulence.

2.3 Continuation Bias and Its Impact on Flight Safety

This incident unfolded during the descent and approach phase of the flight. The original plan was to ferry four occupants to Dumaguete Principal Airport. While the pilot had access to weather updates at the destination through a contact in Dumaguete, there was no en-route weather information available. Despite visually identifying adverse weather conditions ahead (Figure 4), the pilot continued the approach as planned after transitioning from another air traffic control sector and receiving clearance to descend.

As instructed by Mactan Approach, the flight descended to 8,000 feet, passing reporting point Nanas, before being handed off to Dumaguete Tower for the final phase of the flight. During this descent, the pilot reduced airspeed below the recommended maneuvering speed of 140 knots (Figure 5), an action that, while intended to mitigate turbulence effects, also reflects a reactive adjustment rather than a proactive reassessment of the situation. This pattern demonstrates continuation bias, the unconscious cognitive tendency to persist with an original plan despite emerging threats.

2.4 Situational Awareness (SA) and Decision-Making Breakdown

As continuation bias interferes with a pilot's ability to detect and interpret critical situational cues, breakdowns in situational awareness (SA) occur. In this case, the pilot's inappropriate actions and inactions were likely due to being progressively overwhelmed by successive indications of deteriorating conditions, leading to poor management of the aircraft's performance. This ultimately resulted in non-optimal decisions that compromised safety.

2.5 Threat and Error Management (TEM) Considerations

Investigations revealed significant adverse weather conditions along the aircraft's descent path. Within the framework of Threat and Error Management (TEM), pilots should maintain complete awareness of operational threats to avoid surprises, develop a shared understanding of risks, and prepare viable alternatives. Risk-averse decision-making should always take precedence, meaning pilots must adopt a defensive and conservative approach when faced with potential hazards.

Best practices for avoiding hazardous weather include:

- Keeping a safe distance from weather build-ups or thunderstorms.
- Offsetting the flight path to avoid embedded convective weather.
- Using all available resources, including Air Traffic Control (ATC), to reassess options.
- Diverting to an alternate airport or returning to a safer location rather than pressing forward.

Flying through embedded thunderstorms presents a severe risk of structural failure and fatal accidents. The safest option is to either turn back or divert and allow adverse weather to pass, even if this results in delays.

2.6 Loss of Control and Recovery

As the flight progressed, it entered cloud cover, encountering heavy rain and strong winds. At coordinates N 9.563873, E 123.238487, approximately 16 nautical miles north of Dumaguete Airport, the aircraft became unstable, banking unexpectedly to the right before losing control and entering an abrupt spiral descent. The altitude dropped suddenly, but the pilot managed to recover and leveled off at 2,000 feet.

After checking on the occupants and explaining the situation, the pilot continued the flight without declaring an emergency. Upon contacting Dumaguete Tower, the pilot did not request priority handling, despite the aircraft's compromised condition. As a result, the flight was placed on hold while a scheduled commercial aircraft departed.

The aircraft landed normally at Dumaguete Principal Airport and was directed by ATC to park at the general aviation ramp. The pilot and occupants safely disembarked, concluding the flight without further incident.

2.7 Safety Lessons

Continuation bias played a significant role in the pilot's decision to proceed despite evident risks. Situational awareness degradation led to suboptimal decisions, increasing operational risk. A proactive risk-assessment mindset is crucial-pilots should prioritize weather avoidance rather than adaptation. Emergency declarations and ATC coordination should be utilized when an aircraft's integrity may be compromised. This event highlights the critical importance of recognizing and countering continuation bias to enhance flight safety and prevent escalation of hazardous situations.



Area of Occurrence.

Figure 4 - PAGASA weather report as RP-C5801 was on the area.



approved by the observed in AIRSPEED LI	MITAT	al Avia leratio	in this ation Ad n of thi	sec Iminii s airg	tion have been stration and must plane
SPEED	KNOT	AS	IAS KNOTS MPH		REMARKS
Never Excord	223	257	223	257	Do not exceed this speed in any operation
Maximum Structural Cruising VNO	195	225	195	225	Do not exceed this speed except in smooth air and then only with caution
Maneuvering V _A	156	180	166	180	Do not make full or abrupt control movements above this speed
Maximum Flap Extension/ Extended V _{FE} (Approach 15°) (Full down 30°)	152 122	175 140	152 122	175	Do not extend flaps or operate with flaps ex- tended above this speed
Maximum Landing Gear Operating/ Extended VLO and VLE	152	175	152	175	Do not extend, retract or operate with landing gear extended above this speed
Air Minimum Control Speed ^V MCA	81	93	81	93	Minimum speed for directional controllability after sudden foss of engine
Vlaximum With Julity Doors Removed	174	200	174	200	Utility door re- moval kit must be installed

Figure 5 - The BE-58 aircraft speed limitations.

2.8 Aircraft Inspection

The pilot conducted an inspection of the aircraft after all occupants had disembarked and discovered that the left elevator was missing (Figure 6). Before its complete detachment, the loose elevator likely caused instability, contributing to the uncontrolled maneuver and abrupt altitude change.



Figure 6 - The aircraft missing left elevator.



Once the left elevator fully separated from the stabilizer structure, the pilot regained control of the aircraft. No issues were detected with the power plant or flight control systems. The aircraft was placed in a holding pattern before receiving clearance to land at Dumaguete Principal Airport.

According to the Raytheon Aircraft Company shop manual on overhaul and replacement schedule, the elevator is classified as an "on-condition" component. This means it remains in service until failure, with maintenance or replacement performed only upon detecting a malfunction.

3.0 CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings

- a. The pilot is trained and qualified on the Textron Aviation Inc., Baron BE-58 type of aircraft and its company procedures.
- b. The pilot possesses valid airmen license and medical certificate issued by the CAAP.
- c. All the aircraft occupants alighted the aircraft safely.
- d. Instrument meteorological condition prevailed at the time of the occurrence.
- e. The aircraft was properly released for flight without any discrepancies noted on the day of the occurrence.
- f. The aircraft has a current Certificates of Airworthiness and Registration.
- g. The left elevator was detached from its assembly.
- h. The aircraft was moved to a hangar for security and awaiting schedule of repair.
- i. Dumaguete ATC personnel reported that the pilot did not declare priority or emergency on the event the flight encountered nor report the adverse weather condition.
- j. The aircraft safely landed at Dumaguete principal airport without further events.
- k. The pilot was relying on the personnel contact for the weather update of the destination airport.

3.2 Probable Cause

3.2.1 Primary Cause Factor

a. The structural failure of the left elevator due to the aircraft entering a severe weather system during descent.

The flight encountered a cloud buildup that likely contained strong turbulence, wind shear, or convective activity, resulting in excessive aerodynamic loads that led to the separation of the left elevator.

12

3.2.2 Contributory Factors

- a. The inappropriate decision of the pilot to continue from visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions.
- b. Insufficient weather information by the pilot at the pre-flight planning stage.
- c. The pilot's lack of situational awareness.

4.0 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

4.1 The safety deficiencies detailed in this report have been fully addressed as a result of the safety measures implemented by the Operator. Consequently, no further safety recommendations are being proposed.

5.0 SAFETY ACTIONS

- **5.1** Following the occurrence, Fliteline Airways Phils. Inc. initiated the following safety corrective actions: (Appendix A).
 - a. The company conducted safety meeting to all flight crew, focusing on weather information and briefing for flight operations.
 - b. The company conducted safety meeting to all flight crew and mechanics, focusing on company pre-flight inspections and their responsibilities for flight.

The safety deficiencies presented in this report have been fully addressed and no further safety actions are recommended.

-----END----

