CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board
Aircraft Accident Report

BASIC INFORMATION

Aircraft Registration No.	:	RP-C525
Aircraft Manufacturer	:	Cessna Aircraft Company
Make and Model	:	Cessna Citation Jet
Owner/Operator	:	Crystal Sugar Company, Inc.
Date/Time of Accident	:	September 18, 2013 at 0450Z UTC
Type of Operation	:	General Flight Operation
Phase of Operation	:	Landing Roll
Type of Occurrence	:	Accidental collision with a moving motorcycle
Place of Accident	:	OADI Airport Quezon, Bukidnon, Philippines.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On or about 1109H/0309Z UTC, a Cessna Citation Jet with Registry RP-C525 owned and operated by Crystal Sugar Company, Inc. with two (2) aircrew a Pilot-in-Command (PIC), a Co-Pilot (CP) and two (2) passengers (PAX) on board, took-off within the maximum take-off gross weight of 4,717 kgs from NAIA bound for OADI Airport, Quezon, Bukidnon on a general flight operation mission (Appendix 4). RP-C525 reached airborne on or about 1109H/0309Z UTC and followed the assigned flight plan via Ipata-B462-MBT-MCT-W6-CGO off airways. The aircraft arrived over OADI Airport on or about 1248H/0448Z UTC, fly overhead, joined left downwind then turned to base and made a visual flight traffic pattern for final approach to Runway 36 with the wind cone as reference for wind condition and direction. On or about 1250H/0450Z UTC, according to the pilot, the aircraft touched down approximately 300 meters after the threshold and while on a landing roll, with Airspeed at 90 Knots, a Honda Wave 125 motorcycle suddenly appeared alongside the runway from the right side, was hit by the RH wing tip of the aircraft. The PIC noticed the motorcycle (MC), but the situation was so close that the PIC responded by initially veering the aircraft to the left side to avoid a collision but unfortunately due to uncontrolled circumstances, the head of the MC driver was still hit by the aircraft right wing tip which resulted to his instantaneous death. (Appendix 1) The aircraft sustained a slight dent approximately 1cm deep 6 inches from RH wing tip, while there was no injury to the aircraft occupants. The MC driver whose mangled head was recovered 15 minutes after the accident was later found out to be a relative of one of the employees of Crystal Sugar Co., Inc.

Even though the OADI Airport Security guards conducted clearing operation within the periphery of the airport prior to the scheduled arrival of RP-C525, still the presence of the involved motorcycle within the restricted danger zone was not monitored, hence, its involvement to the fatal freak accident. Moreover, based on the record of the Aerodrome and Air Navigation Safety Oversight Office (AANSOO),

OADI Airport has an expired permit to operate which was found out to be valid only until May 2, 2010 and extended until August 30, 2010. However, AANSOO failed to issue an official document that would prove OADI Airport is closed for normal air operations.

The accident was reported to the Quezon, Bukidnon Provincial Police Office by the PIC and to ADG, FSIS. The information regarding the accident was relayed by ADG, FSIS to OIC, AAIIB after about 2100H/1300Z UTC 18 September 2013 and was further relayed by OIC, AAIIB to ORCC for information.

Copy of the Police report and affidavit of waiver for the autopsy of the fatality was obtained from the accident site by the AAIIB onsite investigator on 1250H/0450Z UTC 19 September 2013 who was sent to initially investigate the accident in the area.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was:

- **Primary Cause Factor**

  The OADI Airport Security guards failed to fully secure the safety of the airport despite conducting clearing operations prior to the scheduled arrival of RP-C525 which may have caused the aircraft accident when a motorcycle suddenly appeared along the right side of the runway during the landing roll. (Human Factor)

- **Contributory Factor**

  - The OADI Airport Management failed to provide safety early warning devices or alarm systems such as safety signages and markers, distress sirens, mobile/roving security patrol, caution lights as well as absence of a perimeter security fence during aircraft take-offs and landings contributed to the accident. (Human Factor)

  - Inadequate communication system as well as absence of a duty air and ground traffic controller during the conduct of air operations in the aerodrome. (Human Factor)

  - The Pilot-in-Command failed to fully clear his final approach, touchdown and landing roll when he accidentally hit the driver of a motorcycle which suddenly appeared along the right side of the runway during the landing roll. (Human Factor)

- **Underlying Factor**

  Failure on the part of the PIC to determine and validate the operational status of OADI Airport before commencing the flight mission to its destination since the subject aerodrome has an expired temporary permit to operate valid only until August 30, 2010. (Human Factor)

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of this investigation, the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board made the following safety recommendations:

- CAAP-AANSOO shall require all owners/operators of airports to provide security measures that would strictly implement flight safety rules and regulations covering stringent clearing and securing the airport pheripery of any obstruction such as, operational hazards, stray animals, pedestrians and the like during air operations in their Area of Responsibility (AOR).

- CAAP-AANSOO shall require all owners/operators of airports to provide safety early warning devices or alarm systems such as safety signages and markers, distress sirens, mobile/roving security patrol, caution lights as well as installation of a perimeter security fence and other basic facilities and equipment in meeting regulatory safety standards.

- CAAP-AANSOO shall review and formulate a feasibility study that would require owners and operators of uncontrolled aerodromes to establish the standard communication system and detail well- trained air and ground traffic controllers during the conduct of air operations in their respective aerodromes. Results of the review and study shall be inputted in the amended CAR governing Aerodromes.

- CAAP-FSIS shall strictly require all pilots during the regular check-rides to properly perform flight maneuvers especially during VFR take-off and landing proficiencies focusing on the application of maximum visibility awareness concentrating on making use of peripherals as well as the depth perception.

- CAAP-AANSOO shall review and formulate a mechanism that would establish an updated computerized Data Base on the status of all uncontrolled aerodromes, whether operational or non-operational, restricted or limited operations prescribed by CAAP regulations for the purpose of a systematized and accurate filing of Flight Plans by all pilots prior to a scheduled flight mission.