



Republic of the Philippines  
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
**CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES**  
MIA Road, Pasay City 1300

## AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRY BOARD

### **FINAL REPORT**

### **RP-C2726** **AGUSTA A109E**

---

***OPERATOR: MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION***

***TYPE OF OPERATION: GENERAL AVIATION***

***DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JULY 5, 2015***

***PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: MT. MACULOT, BRGY. PINAGKAISAHAN,  
CUENCA BATANGAS, PHILIPPINES***



**Republic of the Philippines**  
**CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES**

---

**BASIC INFORMATION**

Aircraft Registration No.	:	RP-C2726
Make and Model	:	Agusta A109E
Owner/Operator	:	Malate Tourist Development Corporation
Address of Operator	:	2184 Adriatico St. Cor. Quirino Avenue, Manila
Date/Time of Accident	:	July 5, 2015 / 0420Z UTC (1220H)
Type of Operation	:	General Aviation
Phase of Operation	:	Cruise
Type of Occurrence	:	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
Place of Accident	:	Mt. Maculot, Brgy. Pinagkaisahan, Cuenca Batangas

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

On July 5, 2015 at about 1200H (LT), an Agusta A109E type of aircraft with Registry No. RP-C2726, took off from M/Y Ark Angel Yacht anchored off-shore along the coast of Puerto Galera, Mindoro on a continuation of a flight plan. The Flight Plan was a Visual Flight Rule (VFR) filed and approved on July 4, 2015 with itineraries listed as Manila Domestic Airport - Puerto Galera, Mindoro (RON M/Y Ark Angel) - Lipa City Batangas. There were eight (8) persons on board manifested as one (1) pilot and seven (7) passengers, including a designated CAAP Check Pilot.

A CAAP Check Pilot was included in the Flight Plan to conduct annual proficiency check ride to the Pilot after his license was surrendered for safekeeping in CAAP-LCD last March 2015 to attend a non-flying training course abroad from March - June 2015. The Pilot was due for annual proficiency check ride on May 31, 2015.

Upon return from training sometime last June 2015, the Pilot submitted his application to undergo the annual proficiency check ride. The attesting Pilot of LCD failed to recognize that the Pilot has also accumulated a recency problem because he was inactive for more than 90 days and the need for additional flying hours, together with a Flight Instructor is necessary as a requirement. During the interview, the designated CAAP Check Pilot averred that hours before the scheduled flight to Puerto Galera, wherein he is one the passengers manifested in the approved Flight Plan, the Pilot-In-Command (PIC) called him through his cellphone inquiring about his location. He then replied that he was caught in a heavy traffic on his way to the hangar and advised the Pilot to just continue the flight as scheduled if they cannot wait for him.

The Flight was dispatched without the designated CAAP Check Pilot and it was later discovered that a passenger was permitted to board as a replacement with no amendments made to the flight plan.

Likewise, the interview with one of the survivors disclosed that he has no personal knowledge and observation if the pilot was taking any medications or intoxicating drinks during their stay overnight or prior to the flight. He also observed that at the time of departure from Puerto Galera. The weather condition was clear but with with isolated precipitation over the area. However, during the enroute it was getting bad as the aircraft was approaching the town of Cuenca, Batangas.

Based on available surface weather observation report gathered from a Military Base located 25 kms away from the crash site, the weather condition at Brgy. Pinagkaisahan where Mt. Maculot is located was already unfavorable. The sky condition was broken at 1,500 ft. with overcast of 600 feet and ceiling of 1,500 feet. Likewise, visibility was reported to be 0.5 mile over the range of 50 nautical miles.

During the on-scene investigation, the AAIIB Investigators perceived that the aircraft initially hit a full-grown tree at 1,450 feet AMSL and eventually crash landed at 1,500 feet altitude. The fuselage settled upside down after the impact alongside of Mt. Maculot. The tail boom was separated from the frame during the initial impact and other parts of the tail section were torn into pieces. The fuselage settled upside down at about 50 feet away from the tail boom. The pilot's seat was detached from the railing and thrown out of the cockpit. Some instruments were found scattered in the vicinity of the crash site. The cockpit and cabin were damaged but the integrity of the frame was not impaired. The Local residents from Brgy. Pinagkaisahan rushed to the crash site and performed retrieval operation. According to one of the witnesses, the passenger who was seated at the left cockpit seat was still breathing and immediately evacuated to the nearest hospital but eventually declared Dead-on-Arrival (DOA), while the pilot was found dead on the spot. The other six (6) passengers who sustained minor injuries were able to egress from the aircraft and were also brought to the local hospital for immediate medical treatment. Later, the Police authorities assisted by the Local Government personnel proceeded to the crash scene and secured the area.

## **PROBABLE CAUSE**

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was:

- **Primary Cause Factor**

The probable cause of this accident was determined to be that the Pilot lacks proficiency and training when flying in close proximity to instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) that resulted to spatial disorientation and loss of control.

## **SAFETY RECOMMENDATION**

As a result of this investigation, the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board made the following safety recommendations:

- **CAAP-FSIS** thru:
  - a. **CAAP-LCD** to include the requirements for helicopter pilots rated on multi-engine, a scenario-based training in inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions that includes strategies for recognizing, avoiding or safely escaping the IMC conditions specially on VFR operations.
  - b. **CAAP-LCD** shall ensure that the designated check pilot not to allow the pilot to operate the aircraft with known deficiencies in their licenses.
  - c. **CAAP-FOD** to require non-AOC helicopter operators to develop and implement a Safety Management System that is tailored to the Organization's operational requirements in order to foster an organizational safety culture among its personnel.

-----**END**-----