

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board
Aircraft Incident Report

BASIC INFORMATION

Aircraft Registration No.	:	RP-C8993
Make and Model	:	Airbus 320
Owner/Operator	:	Air Asia Zest Inc.
Address of Operator	:	Asian Aeronautics Hangar, GAA Domestic Rd, Pasay City
Date/Time of Incident	:	August 9, 2014 / 0400 UTC/ 1200H
Type of Operation	:	Commercial/Air Transport
Phase of Operation	:	Cruise
Type of Occurrence	:	Pre-emptive Descent due to dual Bleed Air Fault
Place of Incident	:	190 NM to Manila

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 09, 2014, an Airbus 320 type of aircraft with Registry No. RP-C8993 owned and operated by Air Asia Zest Inc. with flight no. Z063 departed from Jingjian International Airport, China bound for Manila. While cruising at FL 256 within Guangzhou FIR, the aircraft encountered an Air Engine Bleed #2 Fault indication. Operational Engineering Procedure was performed by the pilots and continued the climb to FL 370 since there was no Minimum Equipment List (MEL) recorded before the flight.

While maintaining FL 370 about 190 nautical miles to Manila, the aircraft's Air Engine Bleed #1 Fault also indicated. The Pilot in Command requested Manila Control for a preemptive descent to 10,000 feet and fly direct to Manila. While descending they performed the procedure memory item when the ECAM action for emergency descent indicated at 36,000 feet. At FL300 the First Officer activated the dropping of the cabin oxygen manually and the aircraft landed at Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Manila with no injury to the six (6) crew or 109 passengers and damage to the aircraft.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board determined that the probable cause of this incident were:

- **Primary Cause**

The Fan Air Valve Control Thermostat may have sent erroneous signals to Bleed Monitoring Computer #2 causing for the Air Engine Bleed #2 to close while on flight

(Material Failure). Said part is a condition item and has no periodic replacement which opens the possibility of them failing without warning.

- **Contributory Factors**

Absence of manufacturer periodic parts replacement for Fan Air Valve Control Thermostat.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of this investigation, the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board made the following safety recommendations:

- The operator's quality assurance inspectors should be vigilant in the conduct of inspection to ensure strict adherence to the maintenance procedures of the Fan Air Valve Control Thermostat being a condition item.
- The operator to coordinate with Airbus Manufacturer on possible preventive maintenance procedure on the Fan Air Valve Control Thermostat to check latent defects on ground.
- The operator shall ensure that the CVR conversation are isolated and preserved by disconnecting the CVR from the power source following an incident or accident. The CVR shall not be reactivated before their disposition in accordance with PCAR 13.