

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board
Aircraft Accident Report

BASIC INFORMATION

Aircraft Registration No. : RP-C209

Aircraft Type/Model : Cessna 172S

Owner/Operator : Aviatour's Fly'n Inc.

Date/Time of Accident : March 4, 2012/0815H

Type of Operation : Chartered Flight

Type of Occurrence : Missed Approach

Place of Accident : Camiguin Airport, Baylao, Mambajao,
Camiguin Province

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On or about 0715H March 04, 2012 Cessna 172S type of aircraft with Registry RP-C209, took-off from Mactan International Airport coordinates 09 15.086°N 124 42.272°E heading southbound for Camiguin Airport (a national airport) at coordinates 09 15 15.8457N 124 42.13.0186E, Brgy. Baylao, Mambajao, Camiguin Province on a chartered flight operation. On board were 2 (two) aircrew and 3 (three) passengers (Norwegian) spouses and their 3 year old son). After passing overhead Camiguin Airport from the north at about 0812H, the aircraft joined left downwind of runway 25. The prevailing meteorological condition includes an easterly wind at 12knots and 8kms visibility (no rain) with unlimited ceiling. During the approach for landing, the aircraft has reached the point at ½ length of the runway still about 3m high above the runway surface and it was only at a point about ¾ length (400m remaining) still at 3m high when the pilot initiated the go-around (missed approach) procedures. However, the aircraft failed to immediately gain altitude, hence, it hit the tree-line approximately 15 meters from the end of runway 25. Subsequently, it swerved and banked to the left and hit several coconut trees before it finally settled on the ground (crashed) at location about 300m, 240deg from the end of runway 25. There was no post-crash fire. The aircrew and passengers on-board were immediately rushed to the nearest hospital by responding airport personnel and local residents. Two (2) aircraft occupants (the pilot at the right seat and the female passenger at the left passenger seat) were declared dead on arrival at the hospital. Three (3) other aircraft occupants (the PIC at the left pilot seat, the male passenger at the right passenger seat and the 3 year old son being cuddled by the female passenger at the left passenger seat) sustained serious injuries. The aircraft was destroyed (total wreck).

PROBABLE CAUSE

The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board determined that the probable causes of this accident are the following:

- **Primary Cause**
- **Lack of Situational Awareness. (Human Factor) Pilot Error**

The pilots failed to plan properly for the flight by failing to consider the weather condition at the point of destination from the weather data before take-off at the point of origin and to recognize and confirm the actual wind condition over the point of destination before selecting what runway to use. Both pilots failed to recognize the unusual effect of the tailwind component at the whole duration of the approach, hence, the very late decision for a go-around at a critical point in the runway and of the flight parameters.

- **Contributing Cause**
- **Operation Lapse in the designation of aircrew duty (cockpit leadership and management). Human Factor. (Management Error)**

The designation by the operations management of a PPL on the left pilot seat and a CPL who was not a rated FI on the type of aircraft on the right pilot seat for this chartered flight mission proved confusing during the critical event before and leading to the accident.

- **Underlying Cause**
- **Inadequate safety monitoring system of flight plans in departure airports. Human Factor. (Regulatory oversight lapse)**

The duty of CAAP ATS personnel in-charge of accepting and releasing flights thru the flight plans in designated airports included administratively tasks only and does not include safety oversight to determine lapses in license versus cockpit duty.

- **Other Findings (Regulatory).** (Without direct or indirect bearing to the cause of accident but with considerable safety value)

The Certificate of Registration (original registration) provides that the aircraft is authorized to be engaged only in General Aviation, however, the aircraft is listed in the Training Specifications of the operator's ATOC;

The aircraft is not listed in the Operations Specifications of the owner's AOC but used (in this case) for chartered flight operations. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has authorized Aviatour's Flyn Inc. to include and utilize RP-C209 on its domestic non-schedule Air Taxi Air Service.

The designated PIC with PPL license for a chartered flight was unauthorized.

The CAAP personnel in RPVM who accepted the flight for a chartered flight failed to verify the flight plan as filed that the license of the PIC as listed was a PPL.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of this investigation, the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board made the following safety recommendation:

- CAAP-FSIS shall ensure that Operations management of every ATOC operator/organization establish corrective measures and processes so that only organic aircrew listed in current training or operations specifications with appropriate license, recent 90day proficiency and confirmed to have completed company standardization requirement (including route check etc) in accordance with the established safety management system of the operator, shall be designated as aircrew (especially for PIC duty) for every flight operation. Walk-in/non-organic aircrew shall at the most be relegated to supporting duties. Further, the CAAP-designated Principal Operations shall be strictly required to proactively monitor safety operations of respective ATOCs assigned.
- CAAP-ATS personnel in every airport tasked in accepting and approving flight plans shall have the capability of review in basic regulatory standards in the flight plan such as; a PPL holder shall not be allowed the designation as PIC of a commercial flight; other aircrew on board shall have specific duty in the flight plan; a four (4) seat aircraft shall not have more than four occupants on board.
- CAAP-FSIS shall ensure that on initial/renewal of license, pilots of light aircraft shall be made to undergo the effects of tailwind and to recover safely on a missed approach (simulator)
- CAAP-FSIS shall conduct review of syllabus of training for initial and additional ratings of Approved Training Organization Certificate holders (starting with the ATOC holder involved in this accident) versus the actual performance in the succeeding levels of evaluation as supported by documents and surveillance reports to ensure that established standards are appropriately in place at ATOs and actually complied up to the level of knowledge and skill test in the CAAP before issuance of license.
- Aircraft listed on the Training Specifications of the Approved Training Organization Certificate (ATOC) should not be included in Operation Specifications (OPSPECS) of the Charter and Air Taxi operations of the same company.