



**CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES**

STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME

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***STATE SAFETY
PROGRAMME***

for

The PHILIPPINES

Executive Summary

- (a) The Philippines' State Safety Programme includes a regulatory framework and activities within the State to ensure the discharge of the Philippines' obligations under the Chicago Convention.
- (b) The Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs) of the Philippines give effect to the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) Requirements and these provide a sound, simple, cohesive legal framework which is, wherever practicable, consistent and compliant with the Annexes to the Convention and suited to the level of aviation activity within the State.
- (c) The CAAP Requirements comprise a stand-alone system of regulation that largely eliminates the need for constant cross-reference to the CARs or the Annexes.
- (d) In legal terms, the CAAP Requirements do not themselves constitute legislation or regulations: they are the means by which compliance with the legislation may be demonstrated. They are also the means by which the Director General (DG) CAAP can be satisfied as to the basis for the issue or maintenance of a license, certificate or approval. However, the CARs do comply with the ICAO generic definition of 'regulations' in ICAO Doc 9734 *Safety Oversight Manual*.
- (e) All amendments to the CARs and each new or amended CAAP Requirement part will be the subject of a full consultation exercise.
- (f) There shall be CAAP Safety Plan which shall include any variations to cover local needs.
- (g) By these means the Government of the Philippines can be assured, and demonstrate as required, that the aviation industry within the State is meeting the agreed international standards and that the regulatory oversight of the industry is adequate.

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Definitions

For the purposes of this document:

State Safety Programme (SSP) means an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.

Safety performance indicator (SPI) is a measure (or metric) used to express the safety performance in a system.

Safety performance target (SPT) is the desired level of safety performance. A safety performance target comprises one or more safety performance indicators, together with desired outcomes expressed in terms of those indicators.

Note: ICAO Doc.9859 Safety Management Manual describes safety performance indicators and safety performance targets within the concept of an "acceptable level of safety". This concept is used to express safety expectations under a performance-based approach that is designed to complement regulatory compliance.

Safety requirements (initiatives) are the steps that need to be taken to achieve the safety performance targets. They include the operational procedures, technology systems and programmes to which measures of reliability, availability, performance and/or accuracy can be specified.

Service Providers refers to any organization providing aviation services. The term includes approved training organizations, aircraft operators, maintenance organizations, organizations responsible for type design and/or assembly of aircraft, air traffic services providers and certified aerodrome operators, as applicable.

A **hazard** is any situation or condition that has the potential to cause damage or injury.

Risks are the potential adverse consequences of a hazard, and are assessed in terms of their severity and likelihood. When risks have been assessed, **mitigation** is then needed: either to eradicate the hazard, or to reduce the severity or likelihood of the risks.

Part I - General

1. Purpose of this document

- (a) ICAO Doc 9859 *Safety Management Manual*, paragraph 1.4.3 states: ICAO's Standards and Recommended Practices* (SARPs) require that States establish a safety programme to achieve an acceptable level of safety in aviation operations. The acceptable level of safety shall be established by the States concerned.

**see Annexes 6, 11 and 14 to the Chicago Convention.*

- (b) While ICAO currently restricts its requirements for safety programmes and safety management systems (SMS) to Annexes 6, 11 and 14, within the State the opportunity will be taken to extend SMS concepts for continuous safety improvement to all functional areas in anticipation of further changes to ICAO SARPs.

- (c) Therefore, the purpose of this document is to demonstrate:

- compliance by the CAAP with the SARPs of ICAO;
- that the CAAP has conducted gap analysis comparing the State's Safety Programme (SSP) requirements against the existing resources in the State (see SSP Gap Analysis in Appendix – A);
- that the CAAP has developed the State Safety Programme (SSP) and its implementation plan based on the results of the SSP gap analysis (see SSP Implementation Plan in Appendix – B);
- the regulatory framework, thereby enabling visible linkage between national regulatory planning and an operator's/service provider's SMS;
- the integration of the diverse, multidisciplinary safety regulatory activities into a coherent whole, as illustrated in the diagram in Appendix - C;
- that adequate provisions are being made for the safety regulation of the aviation system within the jurisdiction of the Philippines and that the State is meeting the requirements of the larger global aviation system;
- that regulatory, oversight and enforcement functions are in place;
- that risk-based resource allocations approach for all regulatory

functions (proactively targeting regulatory attention on known areas of high risk) is adopted;

- that the CAAP has established performance monitoring for safety regulatory functions (licensing, certification, enforcement, etc.);
- that acceptable levels of safety for aviation within the State are being set and achieved, and expressed in terms of safety performance indicators and safety performance targets;
- that the CAAP has established a hazard identification programme through the implementation of:
 - Mandatory occurrence reporting system;
 - Voluntary (non-punitive) incident reporting system;
 - Service difficulty reporting system, etc.
- that the CAAP has established active and passive safety promotion programmes to assist operators and to make safety information broadly accessible (including safety database, trend analysis, monitoring of best industry practices, etc.);
- that the CAAP has established national safety monitoring programmes (trend monitoring and analysis, safety inspections, incident investigations and safety surveillance);
- regular regulatory safety audits to ensure compliance by all operators and service providers; and
- the Philippines has competent accident and incident investigation capabilities in the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Board (AAIIB) under the CAAP.

2. Background

- (a) The Philippines is a signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) and, therefore, agrees to comply with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) published by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the Annexes to the Convention.
- (b) CAAP is responsible for safety regulation of all aspects of civil aviation, including the licensing of personnel and the certification of aircraft, airlines, airports and air traffic control.
- (c) CAAP is responsible for regulatory oversight of aviation activities within the State and of aircraft on their register wherever they may be.

- (d) DG CAAP has responsibility for ensuring that the CAAP financial and human resources are sufficient for establishment and maintenance of SSP.

3. The Philippines' State Safety Programme Gap Analysis

- (a) The CAAP is responsible for the implementation of a safety programme in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety for the activities performed by the service providers. The State Safety Programme (SSP) is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.
- (b) The implementation of an SSP requires that the CAAP conducts an analysis of its safety system to determine which components and elements of an SSP are currently in place and which components and elements must be added or modified to meet the implementation requirements. This analysis is known as gap analysis, and it involves comparing the SSP requirements against the existing resources in the CAAP.
- (c) The guidelines for the SSP gap analysis provided in checklist format in Appendix – A, provides information to assist in the evaluation of the components and elements that comprise the ICAO SSP framework and to identify the components and elements that will need to be developed. Once the gap analysis is complete and documented, it will form one basis of the SSP implementation plan.
- (d) The gap analysis form included in Appendix – A can be used as a template to conduct a gap analysis. Each question is designed for a “yes” or “no” response. A “yes” answer indicates that the State already has component or element of the ICAO SSP framework in question incorporated into its safety system, whether it matches or exceeds the requirement. A “no” answer indicates that a gap exists between the component/element of the ICAO SSP framework and the safety system in the State.

4. The Philippines' State Safety Programme Implementation Plan

Based on the result of the SSP gap analysis the SSP implementation plan is developed by the CAAP and which is provided in the Appendix – B.

5. Document Control

- (a) This is the State Safety Programme (SSP) for the Philippines required under ICAO Annexes 6, 11 and 14. The copy of the SSP will be made available to all regulatory staff having safety oversight responsibilities by the Aerodromes and Air Navigation Safety Oversight Office

(AANSOO) and Flight Standards Inspectorate Service (FSIS).

- (b) Changes to this document will be achieved by a re-issue of the entire document rather than by the amendment of individual pages.
- (c) It is the function and responsibility of the Regulatory Standards Divisions (RSD) of AANSOO and FSIS to review the document at least annually to ensure the relevance and currency of all Legislation, Regulations, CAAP Requirements and Advisory Circulars etc.

6. Distribution List and Record of Copies of the SSP Document

The total number of copies of this SSP document produced for use by the CAAP officials is shown below. One printed copy of the manual has been designated as the "Master Copy". Some users are provided with a printed copy of the SSP document while others are given an electronic copy. This is also indicated in the table below.

Copy No.	SSP Document User Name	Print (P) Electronic (E)	Signature	Date Provided	Date Returned
1	Director General	P/E		04/08/14	04/08/14
2	Deputy DG	P/E		4/8/14	4/8/14
3	ADG FSIS	P/E		4/21/14	4/21/14
4	Chief AANSOO	P/E		4/8	4/8
5	Corporate Secretary	P/E		4/8/14	4/8/14
6	Technical Library	P/E		4-8-14	4-8-14
7	Enforcement and Legal Service	P/E	 Dione	4-8-14	4-8-14
8	Finance	P/E		4/8/14	4/8/14
9	ATS	P/E		4/8/14	OTO TO TODAY
10	ADMS	P/E	MARIAN M.	4-8-14	4-8-14
11	ANS	P/E		4/8	4/8
12	Flight Surgeon	P/E		4-8-14	4-8-14
13	ICACS	P/E		4-8-14	4-8-14
14	MIS	P/E		4-8-14	4-8-14
15	CATC	P/E		4-14-14	4-14-14
16	AAIIB	P/E		4-16-14	4-16-14
17	FICG	P/E		4-23-14	
18	ADMIN	P/E		4-16-14	4-16-14
19	HRMD	P/E		4-16-14	
	FSIS/RSD	P/E		5-23-14	

Part – II The Philippines’ State Safety Programme

1. State Safety Policy and Objectives

1.1 CAAP Safety Standards

The Philippines has promulgated a national legislative framework, R.A. 9497, and specific regulations - Philippine CARs, CAR-ANS and CAR Aerodromes - to ensure compliance with international and national standards, and that define how the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) will oversee the management of safety in the State. This includes the CAAP’s participation in specific activities related to the management of safety in the Philippines, and the establishment of the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of organizations in the system. The safety standards are periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the State.

1.1.1 Safety Regulatory Framework – Objectives and Criteria

(See diagram at Appendix – D)

The regulatory framework meets the following objectives or criteria:

- (a) To ensure that the safety regulatory regime of the Philippines meets the ICAO 8 Critical Elements of a safety oversight system (see Appendix – E). Effective implementation of the Critical Elements demonstrates that CAAP is **‘fit for purpose’** safety regulatory body.
- (b) Legislative system in the Philippines comprises three tiers:
 - the primary aviation legislation: in this case the Civil Aviation Act of 2008 known as R.A. 9497,
 - the secondary legislation: the operating Civil Aviation Regulations of the Philippines (CARs); and
 - the supporting requirements and guidance: CAAP Requirements and Advisory Circulars (ACs).
- (c) The regulatory framework enables the fulfillment of the obligations of the Philippines under the Chicago Convention within the State. More detailed information about the legal framework may be found at CAAP Website: [www.caap.gov.ph].
- (d) The regulatory framework provides consistency and compliance with the Annexes to the Convention wherever practicable.
- (e) The regulatory framework gives effect to, or enables, the application of the CAAP Requirements.

- (f) The regulatory framework ensures the Civil Aviation Regulations of the Philippines provide a sound legal framework for the adoption of the CAAP Requirements in a modern, cohesive package of Requirements.
- (g) The CAAP Requirements, wherever possible, comprise a stand-alone system of regulations that largely eliminates the need for constant cross-reference to the CARs or the ICAO Annexes.
- (h) The CAAP Requirements and CAAP ACs provide a simplified interpretation of the CARs wherever practicable.
- (i) The regulatory framework suits the level of aviation activity in the Philippines.
- (j) The regulatory provisions use ICAO terminology wherever possible.

1.1.2 Civil Aviation Act of the Philippines

The Civil Aviation Act of 2008 or R.A. 9497 is the primary legislation that provides the authority to implement other statutory instruments in the area of civil aviation within the Philippines.

1.1.3 Civil Aviation Regulations

- (a) The operating Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs) of the Philippines is secondary (i.e. subordinate) legislation. The CARs enables, or gives power to, the requirements and guidance contained in the CAAP Requirements and CAAP ACs.
- (b) The CAAP has, in recent years, made a series of amendments to the CARs relevant to the FSIS to address the objectives and criteria above. The latest revision is a re-write simplifying and modernizing the FSIS CARs to form part of a coherent unit with the CAAP Requirements, the CAAP Requirements to be completed and shall take the lead, and the CARs providing mainly the necessary legal basis. The CARs for the ANS shall be reviewed and amended accordingly in the same manner.
- (c) It is important to note that the DG CAAP is given a wide variety of discretionary powers under the CARs to grant certificates, licenses and approvals of various kinds.

1.1.4 CAAP Requirements

- (a) The basic philosophy underlying the CAAP Requirements is to have a package of requirements that forms a means of compliance with the ICAO SARPs that is consistent with the legislation in force.

- (b) The CAAP is required to produce the means of compliance to enable the DG CAAP to be satisfied that applicants for, or holders of, licenses, certificates and approvals meet their legal obligations. The DG CAAP has the authority to publish requirements under R.A. 9497. It should be stressed that the CAAP Requirements do not constitute “regulations” in legal terms. They do, however, conform to the wider ICAO definition of regulations within ICAO Doc 9734 *Safety Oversight Manual*.
- (c) The CAAP Requirements set out, for the benefit of those regulated:
- the requirements for obtaining and holding a license, certificate, authority or approval;
 - the way in which the rights and privileges of licenses, certificates, authorities or approvals are exercised;
 - the way obligations which come with the privileges are to be discharged; and
 - general instructions regarding the operation and piloting of aircraft.
- (d) The criteria to be applied in relation to CAAP Requirements are that:
- Penalties or sanctions for failure to comply with any obligation imposed upon a person or organization must be contained in Civil Aviation Regulations if it is to be enforceable.
 - The CAAP Requirements do not themselves constitute legislation or regulations: they are the means by which compliance with the legislation may be demonstrated. They are also the means by which the DG CAAP can be satisfied as to the basis for the issue or maintenance of a license, certificate or approval.
 - The CAAP Requirements employ common terms or expressions used by ICAO in making the SARPs and adopted by most of the countries around the world.

1.1.5 CAAP Advisory Circulars

Whereas the CAAP Requirements are intended to provide a comprehensive suite of requirements, there is also a need to promulgate additional information which is not appropriate for inclusion in the CAAP Requirements themselves. Such information and guidance is included in CAAP Advisory Circulars (ACs). CAAP ACs cover the following topics:

- Practical, detailed guidance on meeting the requirements in the CAAP

Requirements.

- Information of a temporary nature.
- Administrative material.
- Information published in advance of a formal amendment to CAAP Requirements.
- Where this is a State responsibility, the means of ensuring that aspects of the civil aviation system of the Philippines comply with ICAO SARPs, e.g. MET, ATS, AIS, Charts, PANS-OPS and SAR.

1.1.6 Policies and Procedures

- (a) **Policy** for the State on high-level or controversial issues is generally set through discussion and decision at the Meeting of the CAAP Board (to which DG CAAP may refer topics). The resulting Policy Statements (having been subjected to consultation and approval by the concerned Department) are placed on the CAAP website and published in the *CAAP Regulatory, Administrative and Technical Procedural Manual*. Policy Statements are used to drive the development of requirements set out in the CARs and CAAP Requirements.
- (b) **Procedures** of a regulatory and administrative nature which are to be used by the CAAP are available to CAAP staff in the *CAAP Regulatory, Administrative and Technical Procedural Manual*.
- (c) **Technical Procedures** assist objective regulation by providing CAAP inspectorate staff with essential information and protocols. As the CAAP Requirements have been designed to suit the needs of aviation activity within the State, the guidance for inspectors has to be consistent with those requirements. Technical procedures provide the mechanism for CAAP inspectors to make an objective assessment of compliance while maintaining the safety objectives of the CAAP Requirements.

1.1.7 Consultation

- (a) All amendments to the CARs and each new CAAP Requirement part will be the subject of a full consultation exercise. CAAP Requirement amendments are subject to consultation unless minor in nature. The consultative material is placed on the CAAP website for comment usually for a period of at least 12 weeks. A Comments Log showing all comments and CAAP's responses is posted on the CAAP website following the consultation period. The following will be consulted:

- the concerned Department;
 - the concerned Agency; and
 - the aviation industry;
- (b) Additionally, it is open to any person reading the consultation on the website to comment.

1.1.7.1 Monitoring and Review of the Philippines' State Regulatory Framework

- (a) **Oversight of the regulatory framework:** The regulatory framework is monitored continuously by the CAAP in the course of its usual regulatory business. A full, formal review of the framework will be undertaken in accordance with the CAAP Business Plan. The current Business Plan can be viewed and downloaded from the CAAP website, www.caap.gov.ph.
- (b) **Maintenance of the regulatory framework:** The DG CAAP is responsible for the administration necessary to maintain the regulatory framework. The CAAP has suitable procedures and is adequately resourced (staffed, funded etc), for the longer term, to fulfill this task. The CAAP Business Plan describes this commitment in detail.

1.2 CAAP Safety Responsibilities and Accountabilities

The Philippines has identified and defined the CAAP requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the establishment and maintenance of the **State Safety Programme**. This includes the directives to plan, organize, develop, control and continuously improve the Philippines' State Safety Programme in a manner that meets the State's safety needs. It also includes a clear statement about the provision of the necessary human and financial resources for the implementation of the State safety programme.

1.2.1 The Philippines' State Regulatory Responsibilities

- (a) Regulatory responsibilities of the Philippines in civil aviation activities are:
- **SARPs.** The Philippines, as signatory to the Chicago Convention, is responsible for implementation of ICAO SARPS within the airspace and at aerodromes for which it has responsibility.
 - **Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP).** The Philippines must establish an appropriate body, often referred to as the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), with the necessary

powers to ensure compliance with the regulations.

- **Safety oversight.** The Philippines must establish appropriate safety oversight mechanisms to ensure that operators and service providers maintain an acceptable level of safety in their operations.
- (b) In the discharge of regulatory responsibilities of the Philippines, the CAAP should:
- Represent a well-balanced allocation of responsibility between the State and the operator or service provider for safety;
 - Be capable of economic justification within the resources of the CAAP;
 - Enable the CAAP to maintain continuing regulation and supervision of the activities of the operator or service provider without unduly inhibiting their effective direction and control of the organization; and
 - Result in the cultivation and maintenance of harmonious relationships between the CAAP and the operators and service providers.

1.2.2 Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines

- (a) The Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) is the State's agent for implementing the legislative and regulatory provisions for aviation safety. In effect, the CAAP develops and delivers the State's safety programme.
- (b) The CAAP is guided by:
- (1) A clear statement of its vision and mission regarding safety (refer to CAAP Safety Policy attached in Appendix – F);
 - (2) A well understood and accepted set of:
 - Operating principles, such as delivering safe and efficient service consistent with public expectations and at reasonable cost; treating clients and employees with respect, etc.; and
 - Corporate values such as competence, openness, fairness, integrity, respect, responsiveness to client needs, etc.;
 - (3) A statement of the CAAP's safety objectives; for example, reduce the probability and consequences of unsafe aviation occurrences, improve understanding throughout the aviation industry and general public of the Philippines' actual safety performance; and
 - (4) Strategies for fulfilling the objectives; for example, reduction of safety

risks to aviation through the identification of those operations that fall below accepted levels, encouraging their return to an acceptable level of safety or, if necessary, rescinding their certification.

- (c) The CAAP Organizational Structure is given in Appendix – G which shows all safety regulatory functions of CAAP.

1.2.3 Safety Responsibilities and Accountabilities of the DG CAAP

- (a) The DG CAAP is responsible for:

- (1) Establishing and implementing the rules, regulations and procedures for safe and efficient aviation on the following areas:

- Personnel licensing;
- Procedures for obtaining and renewing:
 - Operating Certificates;
 - Airworthiness Certificates;
 - Aerodrome Certificates, etc.;
- Operation of Air Traffic Services;
- Conduct of accident and incident investigations, etc.

- (2) Implementing a system for safety oversight of the entire civil aviation system by surveillance, inspections and safety audits, etc.;

- (3) Carrying out enforcement actions as necessary;

- (4) Monitoring technological developments and best industry practices with a view to improving the Philippines' aviation system performance;

- (5) Maintaining a system of aviation records, including licenses and certificates, infractions, reported accidents and incidents, etc.;

- (6) Conducting analyses of safety trends, including accident/incident data, service difficulty reports, etc.; and

- (7) Promoting safety through the dissemination of specific safety materials, conducting safety seminars, etc.

- (b) The DG CAAP is accountable for:

- (1) ensuring that the CAAP financial and human resources are sufficient for implementation, establishment and maintenance of SSP.

1.3 Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation

The Philippines has established an accident and incident investigation process, the sole objective of which is to support the management of safety in the State and not the apportioning of blame on liability.

- (a) The investigation of accidents and serious incidents is subject to separate regulations which do not form part of the CARs.
- (b) The DG CAAP appoints the Investigator-In-Charge (IIC). The IIC should be independent from the regulator, although the regulator may be asked to provide technical expertise.

1.4 The Philippines' Civil Aviation Enforcement Policy

The Philippines has promulgated an enforcement policy that allows service providers to deal with, and resolve, events involving safety deviations and minor violations internally, within the context of the service provider safety management system (SMS), to the satisfaction of the authority. The enforcement policy includes provisions for the CAAP to deal with events involving gross negligence and willful deviations through established enforcement procedures.

- (a) The CARs confers on the DG CAAP the power of enforcement and this power may be delegated to the Deputy Director General. Breach of the CARs is a criminal offence carrying a maximum penalty which depends on the nature and circumstances of the breach.
- (b) Although the CAAP Requirements do not themselves constitute legislation or regulations, they are the means by which the CAAP can be satisfied as to the basis for the issue or maintenance of a license, certificate or approval. Therefore, non-compliance with the CAAP Requirements may result in the CAAP revoking a license, certificate or approval, refusing to grant a license, certificate or approval or granting a license, certificate or approval with conditions.
- (c) The revised CAAP enforcement policy allows:
 - (1) Operators/service providers to deal with, and resolve, events involving safety deviations and minor violations internally, within the context of the service provider safety management system (SMS), to the satisfaction of the CAAP;
 - (2) The CAAP to deal with events involving gross negligence and willful deviations through established enforcement.

2 The Philippines' State Safety Risk Management

2.1 Safety requirements for service providers' and operators' SMS

The CAAP has established the controls which govern how service providers will identify operational hazards and manage safety risks. This includes the requirements, specific operating regulations and implementation policies for service providers' SMS. The requirements and specific operating regulations are periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the service providers.

- (a) The Memorandum Circular (MC) 02-11 – *“Establishment and Implementation of Safety Management System (SMS)”* - requires that the operators and service providers shall have in place a safety management system in their operation 30 days after the FSIS and AANSOO shall have developed and promulgated the procedure orders. The operators and service providers shall also develop, separately, the SMS implementation plan considering a phased approach of its implementation and shall be approved by the CAAP.
- (b) The hazard identification process and safety risk management are described in the following CAAP Advisory Circular:
 - CAAP AC 139 & CAR-ANS-009-01-0 – *“Implementation of Safety Management System (SMS) for Aerodrome & ANS Providers”* - Development of SMS Manual by Operators and Service Providers for their Operations (Aerodrome Service and Air Navigation Service)
 - CAAP AC 01-004 *“Implementing an Acceptable Safety Management System”* (AOCs, AMOs, and ATOs)
- (c) The CAAP has established, following requirements for the operator's/service provider's SMS to achieve by the operators/service providers, an acceptable level of safety in their operations:
 - Mandatory occurrence reporting scheme;
 - Voluntary (non-punitive) incident reporting scheme;
 - Service difficulty reporting scheme;
 - Wildlife/bird strike hazard reduction programme; etc.
- (d) The following CAAP ACs give detailed guidance on those schemes/programmes mentioned in 2.1 (c) above:
 - CAAP Advisory Circular on Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme – to be developed (
 - CAAP AC No. 01-005 – Guidelines for Voluntary Self-Disclosure [(Voluntary (non-punitive))] Incident

Reporting scheme;

- CAAP AC No. 13-002, Voluntary Incident Reporting
- CAAP AC No. 139-05-A - Wildlife/bird strike hazard Assessment at or in the vicinity of the Airport. Establishment of Wildlife Hazard Management at Airports by Aerodrome Operators;
- CAAP AC No. 139-AN/RSP-01 – Establishment of Local Runway Safety Programme and Local Runway Safety Team by Aerodrome Operators

2.2 Approval of service provider's acceptable levels of safety (ALoS)

The CAAP shall agree on, and approve, acceptable levels of safety with individual operators and service providers. These acceptable levels of safety shall be commensurate to the complexity of individual service provider's specific operational contexts and the availability of individual service provider's resources to address safety risks. The agreed acceptable levels of safety are expressed by multiple safety performance indicators and safety performance targets, never by a single one, as well as by safety requirements. The agreed acceptable levels of safety shall be periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the service providers.

2.2.1 The CAAP Safety Plan (SP)

- (a) The CAAP Safety Plan represents the more operationally focused part of the SSP established to achieve an acceptable level of safety in aviation operations.
- (b) The CAAP Safety Plan includes the following features:
 - (1) Input from (but not limited to):
 - the CAAP Safety Risk Register:
 - mandatory occurrence reports,
 - voluntary incident report,
 - wildlife/bird strike report,
 - safety initiatives developed by other National Aviation organizations,
 - staff of the CAAP.
 - (2) **Safety Performance Indicators (SPI)** - are the measures (or metrics) used to express the safety performance in a system.

They should be uncomplicated, easy to measure and enable linkage between the Safety Plan and an operator's/service provider's SMS. They will therefore differ between segments of industry, such as aircraft operators, aerodrome operators or ATS providers.

- (3) **Safety Performance Targets (SPT)** - (sometimes referred to as goals or objectives) represent the desired level of safety performance. A safety performance target comprises one or more safety performance indicators, together with desired outcomes expressed in terms of those indicators. These are necessarily determined by considering what safety performance levels are desirable and realistic for individual service providers/operators. SPT should be measurable and acceptable to the parties involved.

Note: This approach enables safety expectations to be expressed in terms that are performance based, for example:

- a. *1.0 bird strike per 1,000 aircraft movements (SPI) with a 50% reduction in five years (SPT).*
 - b. *Safety committee meetings to be held monthly and whenever necessary (SPI) as long as the intervals between meetings are not greater than 6 weeks (SPT).*
- (4) **Safety Requirements** – (sometimes referred to as safety initiatives) are the tools or means required to achieve the safety targets. They include the operational procedures, technology, systems and programmes to which measures of reliability, availability, performance and/or accuracy can be specified.

Examples of safety requirements are:

- CAAP accident prevention programme,
 - a mandatory occurrence reporting system,
 - a voluntary incident reporting system,
 - a service difficulty reporting system,
 - a wildlife/bird strike hazard reduction programme,
 - a runway safety programme,
 - the implementation of the New CNS-ATM System within the next 36 months,
 - etc.
- (5) **Activities** – are the practical tasks to be implemented by the

CAAP, service providers and operators to achieve the SPT.

2.2.2 Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS)

- (a) The concept of acceptable level of safety responds to the need to complement the prevailing approach to the management of safety based upon regulatory compliance, with a performance-based approach.
- (b) An Acceptable Level of Safety expresses the safety goals (or expectations) of the CAAP, an operator or a service provider.
- (c) From the perspective of the relationship between the CAAP and operators/service providers, it provides an objective in terms of the safety performance operators/service providers should achieve while conducting their core business functions, as a minimum acceptable to the CAAP. It is a reference against which the CAAP can measure safety performance.
- (d) In determining an acceptable level of safety, it is necessary to consider such factors as the level of risk that applies, the cost/benefits of improvements to the system, and public expectations on the safety of the aviation industry.
- (e) The acceptable level of safety is expressed by two measures/metrics (**safety performance indicators and safety performance targets**) and implemented through various safety requirements.
- (f) The CAAP is responsible for the establishment of the acceptable level of safety in aviation operations.

The CAAP shall establish, among others, the following acceptable levels of safety to be achieved by the establishment of this safety programme:

- (1) 1.0 fatal accidents per 500,000 hours for airline operators (*safety indicator*) with a 40 per cent reduction in five years (*safety target*);
- (2) 1.0 serious accidents per 200,000 hours for airline operators (*safety indicator*) with a 40 per cent reduction in five years (*safety target*);
- (3) 50 aircraft incidents per 100,000 hours flown (*safety indicator*) with a 25 per cent reduction in three years (*safety target*);
- (4) 200 major aircraft defect incidents per 100,000 hours flown (*safety indicator*) with a 25 per cent reduction over the last three-year average (*safety target*);

- (5) 1.0 bird strike per 1,000 aircraft movements (*safety indicator*) with a 50 per cent reduction in five years (*safety target*);
- (6) No more than one runway incursion per 40,000 aircraft movements (*safety indicator*) with a 40 per cent reduction in a 12-month period (*safety target*); and
- (7) 40 airspace incidents per 100,000 hours flown (*safety indicator*) with a 30 per cent reduction over the five-year moving average (*safety target*);

The CAAP approved acceptable level(s) of safety for different operators/service providers which are given in Appendix – H.

3. The Philippines' State Safety Assurance

3.1 Safety Oversight

The CAAP has established mechanisms to ensure that the identification of operational hazards and the management of safety risks by service providers follow established regulatory controls (requirements, specific operating regulations and implementation policies). These mechanisms include inspections, audits and surveys to ensure that regulatory safety risk controls are appropriately integrated into the service providers' SMS, that they are being practiced as designed, and that the regulatory controls have the intended effect on safety risks.

3.1.1 Safety Oversight of Operators and Service Providers

- (a) The responsibility for regulatory oversight of the operators and service providers rests with the CAAP.
- (b) Oversight is conducted through a mixture of what ICAO terms the 'traditional perspective' and the 'modern perspective' – the CAAP is moving towards the modern perspective.
- (c) Designations in all functional areas of CAAP are under review through the Assessment process.
- (d) CAAP regulatory staff are specialists in the functional area which they regulate.
- (e) Regulatory oversight is conducted through inspections, audits and surveys together with provision of advice and guidance, to ensure that:
 - (1) Operators and service providers meet the national and international standards;
 - (2) the identification of operational hazards and the management of safety risks by service providers follow established regulatory controls (e.g., requirements, specific operating regulations and implementation policies);
 - (3) regulatory safety risk controls are appropriately integrated into the service provider's SMS;
 - (4) regulatory safety risk controls are practiced as designed;
 - (5) regulatory safety risk controls have the intended effect on safety risks.
- (f) Ramp checks of foreign aircraft are conducted by the designated

authority with regulatory responsibility for airworthiness and flight operations. A composite team comprised of an Airworthiness Inspector and a Flight Operations Inspector is established for each operator. Ramp check reports are included in the safety assessment of Foreign Aircraft process.

- (g) For complex general aviation including corporate operations, where an operator uses an operating base in a State other than the State in which the aircraft has been registered, CARs requires the operator to notify the CAA of the State in which aircraft has been registered and the State in which the operating base is located. This is to facilitate the co-ordination of regulatory oversight.

*Note:- Aviation safety has traditionally focused on compliance with regulatory requirements and reacted to undesirable events by prescribing measures to prevent recurrence. A different approach is needed to keep **safety risks at an acceptable level** as the industry continues to develop. The '**modern perspective**' includes the use of safety management systems and is designed to complement regulatory compliance by the proactive use of best practices.*

3.1.2 Internal Oversight Audit of CAAP

- (a) The CAAP has a fully-functioning regulatory and quality management system, as described in paragraph 1.1.6 (b) above. Internal quality assurance audits and internal technical audits are carried out regularly by the CAAP safety oversight services – AANSOO and FSIS. The CAAP Corporate Secretariat Office was established to provide assurance on corporate governance to the CAAP management and Board.
- (b) The AANSOO and FSIS are to audit aviation safety regulations of the State and to advise the DG CAAP and those responsible for aviation safety regulation on:
 - (1) whether the CAAP is complying with the State's obligations under the Chicago Convention;
 - (2) the standard of the State's aviation safety regulation;
 - (3) the adequacy of the resources employed on safety regulation in the CAAP and any remedial measures that may be necessary.
- (c) Assessments are currently made in relation to the ICAO 8 Critical Elements of a safety oversight system (see Appendix – E) to ensure that the CAAP is "**fit for purpose**" regulator, and having particular regard to sustainability.
- (d) It is envisaged that adoption of the Safety Programme system will, in time, permit the CAAP to self-assess by reviewing its safety risk

register, safety performance targets and outputs to ensure:

- the effectiveness of the SSP;
- timely update and improvement of the SSP and sharing of best practices across the CAAP.

3.1.3 ICAO Safety Oversight Audit on State's Safety Oversight System

- (a) In consideration of the critical need for increased attention to global aviation safety, ICAO carries out audits of the CAAP as part of its Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme.
- (b) The ICAO audits assess:
 - the State's regulatory system against the ICAO 8 Critical Elements of a safety oversight system; and
 - the degree to which SARPs have been implemented within the State concern.

3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange

The CAAP shall establish mechanisms to ensure the capture and storage of data on operational hazards and safety risks at an aggregate State's level. The CAAP shall also establish mechanisms to develop information from the stored data, and to actively exchange safety information with service providers and/or other States as appropriate.

3.2.1 Occurrence Reporting and Analysis

- (a) The CARs requires operators and service providers to report occurrences to the CAAP, and the CAAP Regulatory, Administrative and Technical Procedural Manual (CRATPM) contains procedures for handling such reports.
- (b) The CAAP currently uses the European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS) safety database which includes capabilities for analyzing and presenting the information in a variety of formats. ECCAIRS safety database is compatible with ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) System.

3.3 Safety data driven targeting of oversight on areas of greater concern or need

- (a) The CAAP has established procedures to prioritize inspections, audits and surveys towards those areas of greater safety concern or need, as identified by the analysis of data on operational hazards and safety risks areas.
- (b) The CAAP has adopted risk-based resource allocations system for all

regulatory functions (proactively targeting regulatory attention on known areas of high risk).

The Philippines' State Safety Promotion

4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information

The CAAP provides training, awareness, and two-way communication of safety relevant information to support, within the CAAP, and the development of a positive organizational culture that fosters the development of an effective and efficient State safety programme.

- (a) CAAP's remit and budget includes the provision of assistance, training and advice to those responsible for aviation safety regulation within the CAAP. Individual and group training, for both initial and recurrent training, is provided under this heading.

The training/seminar/workshop is focused to promote:

- the development of a positive organizational culture that fosters the development of an effective and efficient State's safety programme; and
- the confidence among regulatory staff in assessing operator's/service provider's SMS and its performance.

(refer to Step 2 of SSP Implementation Plan provided in Appendix – B.)

- (b) The CAAP has established the following methods of communication and dissemination of safety-relevant information within the CAAP:

For critical safety-relevant information:

- Confidential Letters;
- Email system.

For non-critical safety-relevant information:

- CAAP Website;
- CAAP Intranet (CASORT);
- Safety Notice Boards;
- Safety Alerts;
- Safety Newsletters (quarterly);
- Safety Journal (annual).

4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information

The CAAP provides education, awareness of safety risks and two-way communication of safety relevant information to support among services providers the development of a positive organizational culture that fosters safe practices,

encourages safety communications and actively manages safety with the same attention to results as financial management.

- (a) The CAAP supports the implementation of SMS by running seminars/workshops for the industry to promote confidence among operational staff in encouraging and assessing SMS development and performance. The cultivation of an active safety culture at all levels and in all functional areas in the aviation industry is seen as a key area of development.
- (b) The CAAP holds regular meetings with operators and service providers, in order to keep them advised of likely regulatory developments, and develop the required safety culture.
- (c) The CAAP runs a 'State Safety Programme Symposium' every two years, where seminars are provided on key regulatory topics within the Philippines.
- (d) The CAAP has established the following methods of communication and dissemination of safety-relevant information nationally and internationally:

For critical safety-relevant information:

- Confidential Letters;
- Email system.

For non-critical safety-relevant information:

- CAAP Website;
- Safety Alerts;
- Safety Newsletters;
- Safety Journal.

References

- 1 ICAO State Letter Ref. AN 12/51-07/74 dated 7 December 2007, Subject: Proposal for the amendment of Annex 1, Annex 6, Parts I and III, Annex 8, Annex 11, Annex 13 and Annex 14, Volume I, to harmonize and extend provisions relating to safety management.
- 2 ICAO Safety Management Systems Course.
- 3 ICAO Doc. 9859, AN/460 Safety Management Manual, First Edition 2006.
- 4 ICAO Guidance on the Development of a State's Safety Programme Gap Analysis.
- 5 ICAO Doc 9734, AN/959 Safety Oversight Manual, Part A – The Establishment and Management of a State's Safety Oversight System, Second Edition – 2006.
- 6 State Safety Programme for the UK Overseas Territories, Air Safety Support International Limited, First Published – 2007.
- 7 Safety Management Systems, Implementation Procedures Guide for Air Operators and Approved Maintenance Organizations, Transport Canada, TP 14343E, June 2005.

Abbreviations

ADREP	Accident/Incident Data Reporting
CAAP	Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
CARs	Civil Aviation Regulations
CRATPM	CAA Regulatory, Administrative and Technical Procedural Manual
DG	Director General
ECCAIRS	European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems
RQMS	Regulatory and Quality Management System
SAFA	Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft

Appendix - A

Gap Analysis for the Development of the SSP of Philippine Civil Aviation

Note: This Gap Analysis was conducted prior to the development and approval of the SSP Document.

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
Component N° 1 – STATE’S SAFETY POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES			
Element 1.1 – Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) safety standards			
	Has the State promulgated a national legislative framework and specific regulations to allow oversight of the management of safety in the State?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.A. 9497 or the Civil Aviation Act of 2008 was promulgated March 2008; IRR of RA 9497; CARs of the Philippines
	Does the State participate in specific activities related to the management of safety in the State?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The Philippine CARs, SMS requirements, MCs, ACs, and other safety directives form as the bases for service providers and operators in the safe conduct of their operations, and audit/inspection/surveillance programs are the tools of the regulatory and oversight bodies (AANSOO and FSIS) in ensuring that they comply with the above.
	Has the State established requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the management of safety in the State by the civil aviation authority?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP Document establishes the requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the management of safety in the State. The MC and AC on SMS address the requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the management of safety by the operators and service providers.

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	Are safety standards periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the State?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>The existing CARs were promulgated starting in 2009.</p> <p>In FSIS, some safety regulations have been reviewed/amended. In AANSOO, the CAR-ANS are undergoing review for eventual amendments.</p>
	Are safety standards periodically reviewed within the CAAP to ensure that they are up-to-date with respect to international standards?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>The existing CARs were promulgated starting in 2009.</p> <p>The Regulations Review Committee (RRC) was created in 2013 to periodically review the CARs.</p>
	Is the SSP with its defined components and elements established, maintained and adhered to?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>The SSP for the Philippines is still in the development stage. The SMS for each service provider and operator have not been fully developed. The office for the SSP will be created.</p>
	Is the SSP appropriate to the scope and complexity of the aviation operations in the State?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>The draft SSP contains all the relevant aspects of the ICAO SSP framework vis-à-vis the level and complexity of aviation operations in the Philippines.</p>
	Has the State established a safety policy?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>The SSP Document for the Philippines sets a safety policy.</p>
	Is the State's safety policy approved by the CAAP accountable manager or higher authority within the State?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>The SSP Document for the Philippines has been approved and signed by the Director General.</p>

ICAO reference	Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered	Answer	Status of implementation
	Is the State's safety policy promoted by the CAAP accountable manager?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil stipulates that the DG, CAAP accountable manager, shall promote the State's safety policy.
	Is the State's safety policy reviewed periodically?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil requires periodic review of the safety policy.
	Is the State's safety policy communicated with visible endorsement to all employees in the CAAP with the intent that they are made aware of their individual safety responsibilities?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil requires the safety policy be communicated to all employees in the CAAP with the intent that they should be made aware of their individual safety responsibilities. The SMS requirement of the service providers and operators mandates them to communicate the same.
	Has the CAAP developed documentation that describes the SSP, including the interrelationship between its components and elements?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The draft SSP documents the components and description of the safety program of the Philippines. The MC and AC on the SMS development and establishment by service providers and operators describe the interrelationships between the SSP and the SMS. Regular SMS training courses at the CATC also incorporate the SSP requirement in the curriculum.
	Does the CAAP have a records system that ensures the generation and	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The FSIS and AANSOO have separate documentation and retention of records in their respective oversight (audit)

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	retention of all records necessary to document and support the SSP activities?		and regulatory activities. However, the CAAP has yet to establish a coordinated and centralized records system to document and support the SSP. In this regard, the SMIS and SOMS offered by the government of Korea are being considered.
	Does the records system provide the control processes necessary to ensure appropriate identification, legibility, storage, protection, archiving, retrieval, retention time, and disposition of records?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The CASORT of the FSIS provides control processes necessary to ensure appropriate identification, legibility, storage, protection, archiving, retrieval, retention time, and disposition of records. However, the parameters used in CASORT do not include those used by AANSOO. Being comprehensive and integrated systems, the SMIS and SOMS are being considered
Element 1.2 – CAAP safety responsibilities and accountabilities			
	Has the State identified and defined the CAAP's requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the establishment and maintenance of the SSP?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The draft SSP for the Phil identifies and defines the CAAP's requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities regarding the establishment and maintenance of the SSP.
	Do the requirements include directives and activities to plan, organize, develop, control and	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	There are existing CAAP MCs. However, all possible requirements and MCs have not been developed and promulgated to address all

ICAO reference	Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered	Answer	Status of implementation
	continuously improve the SSP in a manner that meets the State's safety needs?		safety standards in the CARs.
	Do the requirements include a clear statement about the provision of the necessary human and financial resources for the implementation and maintenance of the SSP?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The draft SSP categorically requires the provision of the necessary human and financial resources for the implementation and maintenance of the SSP.
	Has the CAAP identified and appointed as accountable manager a qualified person having direct responsibility for the SSP implementation, operation and supervision?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The DG is the ultimate accountable manager having direct responsibility for the SSP implementation, operation and supervision. The CAAP will also create a high-level SSP Steering Committee to provide policy guidance and direction to the SSP; an SSP Implementation Group will be established to lead the implementation and operation of the SSP.
	Is the accountable manager responsible for ensuring that the State's safety programme is performing to requirements in all areas of the CAAP explicitly addressed?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The draft SSP states that the accountable manager is responsible for ensuring that the State's safety programme is performing to requirements in all areas of the CAAP.
	Does the accountable manager have control of the financial and human resources required for the	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The draft SSP states that the accountable manager has control of the financial and human resources required for the proper execution of the

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	proper execution of the SSP?		proper execution of the SSP.
	Does the person overseeing operation and supervision of the State's safety programme fulfil the required job functions and responsibilities?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The draft SSP states that the person overseeing operation and supervision of the State's safety programme should fulfill the required job functions and responsibilities.
	Are CAAP personnel safety responsibilities and accountabilities, at all levels, regarding the SSP well defined and documented?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The draft SSP defines the safety responsibilities and accountabilities of the DG. For lower level SSP positions, the responsibilities and accountabilities have not been properly addressed in the draft SSP.
	Do all CAAP personnel understand their authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities in regards of the SSP and all safety management processes, decisions and actions?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	A few sectors of the CAAP organization do not yet fully understand and appreciate the role and importance of the oversight and regulatory function and responsibilities of the State (CAAP).
Element 1.3 – Accident and incident investigation			
	Has the State established an independent accident and incident investigation process, the sole objective of which is to support the management of safety in the State and not the apportioning of	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The State established the aircraft accident and incident investigating body, AAIB (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Board), but it is still under the jurisdiction and control of the civil aviation authority.

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	blame on liability?		
Element 1.4 – Enforcement policy			
	Has the State promulgated an enforcement policy that allows service providers to deal with, and resolve safety deviations and minor violations internally, within the context of the service provider safety management system (SMS), to the satisfaction of the authority?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The FSIS (Flight Standards Inspectorate Service), the oversight body in charge of airline operators, AMOs, etc., has promulgated its own enforcement policy in the context of the legalese. The other oversight body in charge of aerodrome and ANS services (AANSOO) has started with a draft enforcement policy in the context of SMS. The draft SSP contains a draft enforcement policy in the SMS context.
	Does the enforcement policy include provisions for the CAA to deal with events involving gross negligence and wilful deviations through established enforcement procedures?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The enforcement policy of the FSIS and of the AANSOO draft include provisions for the CAAP to deal with events involving gross negligence and willful deviations through established enforcement procedures.
Component N° 2 – STATE’S SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT			
Element 2.1 – Safety requirements for service providers SMS			
	Has the CAAP established the regulatory controls and developed associated guidance material governing how service providers	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The policy on establishment of SMS by service providers and operators is set in MC 02-11; however, the regulatory controls (procedure orders) have not been developed.

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	will identify operational hazards and manage safety risks?		
	Do these controls include operating regulations and implementation policies for SMS service providers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The policy on establishment of SMS by service providers and operators is set in MC 02-11; however, the regulatory controls (procedure orders) have not been developed.
	Are the operating regulations periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the service providers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	CAAP has established the Regulations Review Committee tasked to periodically review and amend the CARs; however, the RRC is still in the initial stages of reviewing and amending the regulations.
	Is there a structured process within the CAAP to assess how the service providers will manage the risks associated with identified hazards, expressed in terms of probability and severity of occurrence?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The AANSOO Oversight Manual contains provisions for the ANS and aerodrome service providers' internal audit and survey to include identification of hazards and management of risks using SMS concepts and principles. However, the FSIS has not developed such structured process in hazard identification and risk assessment and mitigation.
	Has the CAAP established criteria for evaluating risk?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The MC re establishment of SMS by service providers and operators requires them to adopt the ICAO SMS framework and SMM concepts and principles which include the criteria for

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
			evaluating risk.
	Has the CAAP established criteria and/or guidelines to define risk tolerability?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The MC re establishment of SMS by service providers and operators requires them to adopt the ICAO SMS framework and SMM concepts and principles which include the criteria for evaluating risk.
	Has the CAAP established risk management strategies, including corrective/ preventive action plans, to address recurrence of documented occurrences and deficiencies?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The ICAO SMS framework and SMM, the AANSOO Oversight Manual and the FSIS AC require the operators and service providers to develop and implement hazard identification and risk management strategies, including corrective action plans to address recurrence of documented occurrences and deficiencies.
	Has the CAAP established formal processes for evaluating the effectiveness of the corrective/ preventive measures that have been developed?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The AANSOO and FSIS audit, inspection and surveillance activities include evaluation and documentation of the effectiveness of the corrective/ preventive measures that have been developed by audited operators and service providers.
	Has the CAAP formally documented risk management strategies for corrective/ preventive actions, including	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The AANSOO and FSIS audit, inspection and surveillance activities include evaluation and documentation of the effectiveness of the corrective/ preventive

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	timelines?		measures, including timelines, that have been developed by audited operators and service providers.
	Is there a policy in place that ensures effective safety reporting of safety deficiencies, hazards or occurrences including the conditions under which protection from disciplinary and /or administrative action applies?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The AANSOO Oversight Manual and the CAR-ANS Part 1 contain provisions for Voluntary Reporting of safety deficiencies, hazards or occurrences including the conditions under which protection from disciplinary and/or administrative action applies. The FSIS also has developed and promulgated AC 01-005 (Guidelines for Voluntary Disclosure).
Element 2.2 – Approval of service providers acceptable levels of safety (AoS)			
	Does the CAAP have individually agreed on, and approved, acceptable levels of safety with service providers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The requirement for the establishment of SMS by operators and service providers includes the determination and approval of ALOs. However, the ALOs and ALARPs have not been established.
	Are the agreed acceptable levels of safety commensurate to the complexity of individual service provider’s specific operational contexts?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The requirement for the establishment of SMS by operators and service providers includes the determination and approval of ALOs commensurate to the complexity of individual service provider’s specific operational contexts. The ALARPs and ALOs have not been established.
	Do agreed acceptable levels of safety	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The ALARPs and ALOs have

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	consider individual service provider's resources to address safety risks?		not been established.
	Are agreed acceptable levels of safety expressed by multiple safety indicators and safety targets, as opposed to a single one, as well as by safety requirements?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The ALARPs and ALOs have not been established.
	Are agreed acceptable levels of safety periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the service providers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The ALARPs and ALOs have not been established.
Component N° 3 – STATE'S SAFETY ASSURANCE			
Element 3.1 – Safety oversight			
	Has the CAAP established mechanisms to ensure that the identification of operational hazards and the management of safety risks by service providers follow established regulatory controls? (e.g., requirements, specific operating regulations and implementation policies)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The AANSOO and FSIS have developed and implemented audit, inspection and surveillance programmes of ANS, aerodrome service, aircraft operators, AMOs, and ATOs providers in the context of CARs, ICAO SARPs, MCs, and ACs.
	Do established mechanisms include inspections, audits and	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The audits, inspections, and surveillance by AANSOO and FSIS of the service providers,

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	surveys to ensure that regulatory safety risk controls are appropriately integrated into the SMS service providers?		aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, AMOs, and ATOs' services and facilities include assessment of their local SMS.
	Do established mechanisms ensure that regulatory safety risk controls are practiced as designed?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Audits and surveys of the operators and service providers include assessment of their local SMS and compliance with the CARs.
	Do established mechanisms ensure that regulatory safety risk controls have the intended effect on safety risks?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Audits and surveys of the operators and service providers include assessment of their local SMS and compliance with the CARs.
	Are regular and periodic reviews conducted regarding the CAAP's safety performance?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The CAAP SMS requirement requires periodic reviews to be conducted by operators and service providers regarding their safety performance. The draft SSP for the Phil also requires regular and periodic reviews to be conducted by CAAP regarding the CAAP's safety performance. No implementation yet.
	Do reviews consider changes that could affect the State's safety programme, recommendations for improvement and sharing of best practices across the CAAP?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The draft SSP for the Phil requires regular and periodic reviews to be conducted by CAAP regarding the CAAP's safety performance and recommends adoption of best practices. No implementation yet.

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	Is there a process to evaluate the effectiveness of changes related to the SSP?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established.
	Is there a formal process within the CAAP to develop and maintain a set of performance parameters to measure the effectiveness of the SSP?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established.
Element 3.2 – Safety data collection, analysis and exchange			
	Has the CAAP established mechanisms to ensure the capture and storage of data on operational hazards and safety risks at the State’s level?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.
	Has the CAAP also established mechanisms to develop information from the stored data, and promote the exchange of safety information with service providers and/or other States as appropriate?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information
Element 3.3 – Safety data driven targeting of oversight on areas of greater concern or need			

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	Has CAAP established procedures to prioritize inspections, audits and surveys towards those areas of greater safety concern or need, as identified by the analysis of data on operational hazards and safety risks areas?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.
Component N° 4 – STATE’S SAFETY PROMOTION			
Element 4.1 – Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information			
	Does the CAAP provide internal training, awareness, and two-way communication of safety-relevant information within the CAAP?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The CATC, in collaboration with AANSOO, regularly conducts SMS and RSP courses at least twice a year for all CAAP personnel, particularly service providers. However, with regards to specialized training, a comprehensive internal training programme for regulatory inspectors has not been established.
	Are there communication processes in place within the CAAP that permit the safety programme to function effectively?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.
	Are communication processes (written, meetings, electronic, etc.) commensurate with the size and scope of the CAAP?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.

<i>ICAO reference</i>	<i>Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered</i>	<i>Answer</i>	<i>Status of implementation</i>
	Is information established and maintained in a suitable medium?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.
	Is there a process for the dissemination of safety information throughout the CAAP and a means of monitoring the effectiveness of this process?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.
Element 4.2 – External training, communication and dissemination of safety information			
	Does the CAAP provide external education, awareness of safety risks and two-way communication of safety-relevant information?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SMS and RSP courses at the CATC are available for all stakeholders, government and non-government. There have been participants from the private sector; however, too few of the private participants have availed of the courses.
	Does the CAAP encourage safety communications and actively manage safety within the State?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The CAAP encourages safety communications with operators and service providers. However, voluntary reporting system/scheme has not been institutionalized.
	Are there communication processes in place within the CAAP that allow the SSP to be nationally and internationally promoted?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.

ICAO reference	Aspects to be analyzed or question to be answered	Answer	Status of implementation
	Are communication processes (written, meetings, electronic, etc.) commensurate with the size and scope of the CAAP?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.
	Is information established and maintained in a suitable medium?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.
	Is there a formal process for the external dissemination of safety information throughout the State, and means of monitoring the effectiveness of this process?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	The SSP for the Phil and the SSP office have yet to be established, including a central databank/database for all safety-related data and information.

Appendix - B

The Philippines' State Safety Programme Implementation Plan

Note:- The implementation of the State Safety Programme is based on the following 5 steps.

STEP 1: State safety programme gap analysis:

Conduct a gap analysis vis-à-vis the current status in the Philippines of the following:

- 1. State's safety policy and objectives**
 - 1.1 CAAP safety standards
 - 1.2 CAAP safety responsibilities and accountabilities
 - 1.3 Accident and incident investigation
 - 1.4 Enforcement policy
- 2. State's safety risk management**
 - 2.1 Safety requirements for service providers SMS
 - 2.2 Approval of service providers' acceptable levels of safety
- 3. State's safety assurance**
 - 3.1 Safety oversight (Inspections, audits and surveys)
 - 3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange
 - 3.3 Safety data driven targeting of oversight on areas of greater concern or need
- 4. State's safety promotion**
 - 4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information
 - 4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information

STEP 2: CAAP training programme:

Develop a training programme for CAAP officers to:

1. provide knowledge of **safety management concepts and ICAO SARPs** on safety management in Annexes 6, 11 and 14, and related guidance material; and
2. develop knowledge to **certify and oversee** the implementation of key components of an SMS, in compliance with the national regulations and relevant ICAO SARPs.

STEP 3: Implementation of SMS SARPs:

Develop SMS regulations for operators/service providers.

1. Refer to the SMS components and elements as per the ICAO SMS training course;
2. Prepare guidance material for the implementation of SMS.
Refer to ICAO Doc 9859 and the ICAO SMS training course.

STEP 4: CAAP enforcement policy:

Revise the CAAP's enforcement policy.

1. Operators/service providers allowed to deal with deviations/minor violations internally, within the context of the SMS, to the satisfaction of the authority;
2. Gross negligence, willful deviation and so forth to be dealt through established enforcement procedures.

STEP 5: Development of State safety programme:

Develop the State safety programme (*an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety*) around the 4 components and 11 elements of the ICAO SSP framework.

State safety programme components and elements:

1. State's safety policy and objectives

- 1.1 CAAP safety standards
- 1.2 CAAP safety responsibilities and accountabilities
- 1.3 Accident and incident investigation
- 1.4 Enforcement policy

2. State's safety risk management

- 2.1 Safety requirements for service providers SMS
- 2.2 Approval of service providers' acceptable levels of safety

3. State's safety assurance

- 3.1 Safety oversight (Inspections, audits and surveys)
- 3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange
- 3.3 Safety data driven targeting of oversight on areas of greater concern or need


4. State's safety promotion

4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information

4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information

Appendix - D

The PHILIPPINES' REGULATORY FRAMEWORK



EXTRACT FROM ICAO DOCUMENT 9734

**SAFETY OVERSIGHT MANUAL
PART A**

**CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A
SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM**

ICAO has identified and defined the following critical elements of a State's safety oversight system:

CE-1 Primary aviation legislation

The provision of a comprehensive and effective aviation law consistent with the environment and complexity of the State's aviation activity and compliant with the requirements contained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

CE-2 Specific operating regulations

The provision of adequate regulations to address, at a minimum, national requirements emanating from the primary aviation legislation and providing for standardized operational procedures, equipment and infrastructures (including safety management and training systems), in conformance with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Note: The term "regulations" is used in a generic sense to include but is not limited to instructions, rules, edicts, directives, sets of laws, requirements, policies, and orders.

CE-3 State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions

The establishment of a Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and/or other relevant authorities or government agencies, headed by a Chief Executive Officer, supported by the appropriate and adequate technical and non-technical staff and provided with adequate financial resources. The State authority must have stated safety regulatory functions, objectives and safety policies.

Note: The term "State civil aviation system" is used in a generic sense to include all authorities with aviation safety oversight responsibility which may be established by the State as separate entities, such as: CAA, Airport Authorities, Air Traffic Service Authorities, Accident Investigation Authority, and Meteorological Authority.

CE-4 Technical personnel qualification and training

The establishment of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical personnel performing safety oversight functions and the provision of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should include initial and recurrent (periodic) training.

CE-5 Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety-critical information

The provision of technical guidance (including processes and procedures), tools (including facilities and equipment) and safety-critical information, as applicable, to the technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions in accordance with established requirements and in a standardized manner. In addition, this includes the provision of technical guidance by the oversight authority to the aviation industry on the implementation of applicable regulations and instructions.

CE-6 Licensing, certification, authorization and approval obligations

The implementation of processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise the privileges of a license, certificate, authorization and/or approval to conduct the relevant aviation activity.

CE-7 Surveillance obligations

The implementation of processes, such as inspections and audits, to proactively ensure that aviation license, certificate, authorization and/or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements and function at the level of competency and safety required by the State to undertake an aviation-related activity for which they have been licensed, certified, authorized and/or approved to perform. This includes the surveillance of designated personnel who perform safety oversight functions on behalf of the CAA.

CE-8 Resolution of safety concerns

The implementation of processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies impacting aviation safety, which may have been residing in the aviation system and have been detected by the regulatory authority or other appropriate bodies.

Note: This would include the ability to analyze safety deficiencies, forward recommendations, support the resolution of identified deficiencies, as well as take enforcement action when appropriate.

CAAP Safety Policy

The CAAP is committed to implementing, developing and improving strategies, management systems and processes to ensure that aviation operations uphold the highest level of safety performance and meet national and international standards.


Our Commitment is to:

- ❖ Develop and embed a safety culture across all aviation industries that recognizes the importance and value of effective aviation safety management and acknowledges at all times that safety is paramount.
- ❖ Ensure that the CAAP financial and human resources are sufficient for implementation, establishment and maintenance of the Philippines' State Safety Programme.
- ❖ Clearly define for all regulatory staff their responsibilities and accountabilities for the implementation, establishment and maintenance of the Philippines' State Safety Programme and its performance.
- ❖ Ensure that all regulatory staff are provided with adequate and appropriate aviation safety information and training, they are specialists in their functional areas and competent in safety regulation of operators and service providers.
- ❖ Establish a risk-based resource allocation strategy for all regulatory functions (proactively targeting regulatory attention on known areas of high risk) in the CAAP.
- ❖ Ensure that acceptable levels of safety for aviation operations within the Philippines are being set and achieved, and expressed in terms of safety performance indicators and safety performance targets.

- ❖ Continually improve the Philippines' State Safety Programme and safety performance.
- ❖ Ensure that operators and service providers establish and maintain the safety management system in their operation.
- ❖ Achieve the highest levels of safety standards and performance in aviation operations.



**Director General
Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines**



Approved by:

(sgd)
ROLANDO C. ANDAYA, JR.
 Secretary
 Department of Budget and Management

Appendix - H

Acceptable Level(s) of Safety Performance approved by the CAAP (samples)

A. Aerodrome Operator

The CAAP and *an aerodrome operator* agree on an acceptable level of safety performance to be achieved by the operator SMS:

- (a) No more than one runway incursion per 40,000 aircraft movements (*safety indicator*); a 40 per cent reduction in a 12-month period (*safety target*);

The establishment of low visibility taxi procedures (*safety requirements*).

- (b) 1.0 bird strike per 1,000 aircraft movements (safety indicators) with a 50 per cent reduction in five years (safety target);

The establishment of wildlife/bird strike hazard assessment and reduction programme (*safety requirements*).

B. Aircraft Maintenance Organization

The CAAP and *an aircraft maintenance organization* (AMO) agree on an acceptable level of safety to be achieved by the AMO SMS:

- (a) 200 major aircraft defect incidents per 100,000 hours flown (safety indicators) with a 25 per cent reduction over the last three-year average (safety target);

C. Airline Operator

The CAAP and *an airline operator* agree on an acceptable level of safety to be achieved by the operator SMS:

- (a) 0.5 fatal accidents per 100,000 departures (*safety indicator*); a 40 percent reduction in five years (*safety target*);

The development of PNB approaches for airfields without ILS approaches (*safety requirements*).

- (b) 50 aircraft incidents per 100, 000 hours flown (*safety indicators*) with a 25 per cent reduction in three years (*safety target*);

D. ATS Service provider

The CAAP and ATS provider agree on an acceptable level of safety performance to

be achieved by the service provider SMS:

- (a) No more than one runway incursion per 40,000 aircraft movements (*safety indicator*); a 40 per cent reduction in a 12-month period (*safety target*);

The establishment of low visibility taxi procedures (*safety requirements*).

- (b) 40 airspace incidents per 100,000 hours flown (*safety indicators*) with a 30 per cent reduction over the five-year moving average (*safety target*);